Does art imitate life or does life imitate journalism? Two weeks ago, The Economist trumpeted a looming China-India rivalry as its cover story. One week ago, a series of fresh tensions arose in the China-India relationship. Today I have tried to make sense of some of this in an opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal.

The gist of my argument is that India would do well to keep a cool head, despite needling from China and the concerns – some sensible, some paranoid – of its own media and commentariat. Better still, if India is serious about advancing its own influence as a global power – and increasingly its interests will demand such a status – then it should be getting onto the diplomatic and strategic front foot in its dealings with China.

This would involve, for example, greater Indian engagement in East Asia – a trend excellently examined by C Raja Mohan and notable emerging analysts such as David Brewster and Nitin Pai. One of the challenges for India is to be the active player in building such partnerships, not – as this remarkable account of Lee Kuan Yew's 'Mission India' suggests — the passive one.

Photo by Flickr user Photoportunity, used under a Creative Commons license. 

It would be dull to join the already large chorus of commentators predicting failure for the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, launched this week in Washington. Assuming that readers of The Interpreter are smart enough to work out for themselves why the talks probably won't succeed, I have decided to join the ranks – of perhaps more accurately, the rank – of the optimists.

Writing in the New York Times, the Lowy Institute's Martin Indyk (I think he also works for Brookings) gave a number of reasons why we should 'suspend our disbelief' that the current talks will succeed. In fact, if the talks are to succeed, they will have to produce a general suspension of disbelief by creating four key illusions.

First, the illusion that Jerusalem will remain the undivided capital of Israel, while enabling the Palestinians to build their own capital in East Jerusalem and to have sovereignty over the Muslim holy sites in the Old City. You do the first by re-drawing the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, which have changed considerably since Israel took control of the eastern half of the city in 1967. 

A solution to the question of sovereignty over Muslim holy sites is more difficult, though it is also essential (no Palestinian leader can be seen to barter away Muslim rights in the Old City). It is doable, but they might need David Copperfield for that one. 

Second, the illusion that the roughly 4.8 million Palestinian refugees will be granted the 'right of return', while ensuring that few actually return to Israel. 

It's interesting to read President Obama's remarks about the end of combat operations in Iraq in light of Peter Beinart's speech to the Lowy Institute last week. Beinart argued that the central mission of Obama's presidency is economic — to make America 'solvent' again. To do that, he has to get his country out of two expensive wars while trying to avoid looking wimpish to his Republican opponents.

There's enough in Obama's remarks to reinforce Beinart's thesis:

...our nation’s strength and influence abroad must be firmly anchored in our prosperity at home. And the bedrock of that prosperity must be a growing middle class. Unfortunately, over the last decade, we’ve not done what’s necessary to shore up the foundations of our own prosperity. We spent a trillion dollars at war, often financed by borrowing from overseas. This, in turn, has short-changed investments in our own people, and contributed to record deficits.

You can also detect it in the language Obama uses about Afghanistan:

We will disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, while preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a base for terrorists. And because of our drawdown in Iraq, we are now able to apply the resources necessary to go on offense. In fact, over the last 19 months, nearly a dozen al Qaeda leaders -- and hundreds of al Qaeda’s extremist allies -- have been killed or captured around the world.

Within Afghanistan, I’ve ordered the deployment of additional troops who -- under the command of General David Petraeus -- are fighting to break the Taliban’s momentum. As with the surge in Iraq, these forces will be in place for a limited time to provide space for the Afghans to build their capacity and secure their own future. But, as was the case in Iraq, we can’t do for Afghans what they must ultimately do for themselves.

Notice that the word 'defeat' is only applied to al Qaeda. When it comes to the Taliban, the American mission is just to 'break its momentum'. That's immediately followed by a clear signal that the US wants to hand over to the locals. 

But as Beinart said, Obama hasn't yet laid the rhetorical groundwork for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. To do that, he needs to recast the terrorist threat, so that Americans are convinced it is safe to pull out. There's no hint of that in this speech.

Image courtesy of the White House.

That's The Browser's comment on this Spiegel interview with the foreign minister of Iran. 

Although you'd be hard pressed to say that the interview actually gets better than this explosive opening exchange, the whole thing is worth a read:

SPIEGEL: Mr. Foreign Minister, you are the senior diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran. You represent a nation that prides itself on a cultural history stretching back more than 2,500 years. Don't you find it shameful that people are stoned to death in your country?

Manouchehr Mottaki: You come from a country that murdered millions of people during a tyrannical war, and you want to talk to me about human rights?

(BTW, nice to see a senior Iranian official acknowledging that the Holocaust did happen, even if he is using it as a rather tasteless debating tactic. Mottaki now just needs to convince his boss.)

The recent withdrawal of the last US combat forces from Iraq and the equally recent reminder from the Al Qaeda affiliates across the country that they remain operationally active has elicited little in the way of introspection from commentators in this country. 

Australia left what seems a long time ago, well after public interest in our contribution had faded. If our much more costly military operations in Afghanistan rate such limited discussion in this country, it is hardly surprising that 'yesterday's war' is not considered newsworthy. Nevertheless, one would have thought that at least some discussion was warranted of what our contribution to the overall Iraq venture achieved.

Amid photos of soldiers giving the thumbs up and proclaiming victory as they leave Iraq, there are some who have a sense of the enormity of the problem that remains. In an earlier post, I was critical of those who conflated US withdrawal from Iraq with victory, so I watched with interest the US commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, take the long view in a recent interview: 'To say whether we've won the war or not, we can see that in three to five years, as we see how Iraq turns out. I think we can call operations a success...'

In the good old days of 'classical war', successful military operations were the sole determinant of success. But as General Odierno has acknowledged, contemporary warfare among complex societies is about much more than military operations. And success or otherwise can only be measured after years, or even decades. 

I hope that if parliament ever gets around to debating our commitment to Afghanistan, speakers will have taken heed of General Odierno's words before they pen their own.

Photo by Flickr user tommigodwin, used under a Creative Commons license.

Jim Molan's list of Afghanistan questions begins with, 'Is the war winnable?' But this strategic question ought to be preceded by a grand-strategic one: Is the war worth winning?

Here are some other questions that flow from those five words:

• What are the most important issues facing Australia in the modern world, and does our Afghanistan commitment reflect these priorities? Should our military and diplomatic focus instead be on:
  • coping with the rising powers of Asia and the relative decline of the US?
  • preparing for Australia's own relative decline against fast-growing Southeast Asian economies?
  • reinforcing and encouraging Indonesia's transition to democracy and modernity?
  • building regional and international institutions that can guard Australia against strategic shocks, whether these be economic, strategic or environmental?
• At what point should Australia stop trying to build credits with the US through troop commitments, and instead serve the alliance by counseling US restraint?
• Should Australia try to convince the US — perhaps by withdrawing our forces — that the war is a strategic sideshow and that the US ought to focus its attention on rebuilding its economic strength so that it can remain a strong Pacific power?
• Will the terrorist threat diminish noticeably if we achieve our Afghanistan war aims, or will terrorists simply migrate to other lawless territories?
• If Australia's withdrawal did lead to an increased terrorist threat, could we live with that?
• In terms of counter-terrorism, what is the opportunity cost of the Afghanistan mission? Could the resources be better used to:
  • buttress our very successful regional counter-terrorism approach, which focuses on intelligence and policing?
  • do something about Australia's diplomatic deficit, given that diplomacy has been crucial to opening doors to regional counter-terrorism cooperation?
  • improve the resilience of Australian infrastructure against terrorist strikes?

Australia is having a war-time election without mentioning the war. The political leaders don't talk willingly about Afghanistan. But they do stop campaigning to go to the funerals of soldiers who have been fighting.

Perhaps this election demonstrates an Australian political reality of The Long War: the longer it goes, the less the major parties want to debate it. The commitment has become both the start and end of the discussion. We are in the war because we are in the war. The circular logic keeps circling.

Julia Gillard delivered a formal campaign speech that was unremitting in its domestic flavour. No Afghanistan there. Indeed, Defence only got a mention in a half-joke about Tony Abbott sitting in 'the safety of Kirribilli as he watches luxury yachts go by', directing the Navy to stop the boats. 

Tony Abbott's formal campaign launch at least gestured to the outside world, beyond the stop-the-boats slogan:

As well, within three months, in person and on the spot, I would have reassured our soldiers in Afghanistan that Australians support their mission. Our most important trading partners and our principal allies would know that they can count on Australia.

Labor re-committed to the good war it inherited from the Coalition. And if the Coalition wins, the same will apply. It's not a matter of 'don't mention the war' so much as 'just keep doing the war'. The two sides agree on the grim task. The lack of debate reflects the lack of difference. Or any wish to look at alternatives to the established, shared policy.

My previous post concerning claims of an attack against a Japanese tanker in the Straits of Hormuz at the end of July stated that an attack appeared to be a less likely cause of damage to the tanker. It looks like this may have been wide of the mark. Not only has a group (the Abdullah Azzam Brigade) claimed responsibility for the attack, but Emirati authorities have confirmed that they found traces of homemade explosives around the damaged area.



The incident illustrates the continued strategic aspirations of terrorist planners, but thankfully, from the Christmas underpants bomber through to this latest attack, it also shows that, for the most part, their aspirations exceed their capabilities.

Of concern is the claim that the Abdullah Azzam Brigade's subsidiary, the Yusuf al-Uyayri battalion, launched the attack. Given that the Abdullah Azzam Brigade normally operates in the Sinai and the Levant and that al-Uyayri was one of the original leaders of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) prior to his death in 2003, the claim could indicate one of two things: the attack was really the work of the now Yemen-based AQAP, or that the two organisations are cooperating in mounting regional attacks.

Nothing has been said about the launch point for the attack, although it can really only have come from the UAE, Oman or Iran. Regardless of which country it was launched from, or the relatively amateurish nature of the attack, the fact that it was launched at all will precipitate a rapid change in Gulf countries' maritime security strategies.

Previously concerned with the protection of oil and gas platforms, interdicting people smugglers from South Asia or patrolling disputed territorial waters, the addition of terrorist attacks on oil and gas shipping is going to add another layer of complexity to an already crowded security agenda. And in a strange twist, it is one in which Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbours have a common, rather than competing, interest. It will be interesting to see whether this latest attack is able to engender any security cooperation between Tehran and any of the Gulf Arab capitals.

Here are the details, via the Wall Street Journal:

MOSCOW—The Medvedev administration plans to include attack helicopters in an expanded arms package for Iran, swelling the size of the proposed deal to as much as US$60 billion over 10 years, according to officials familiar with the matter.

The deal would be the largest overseas Russian arms sale, the officials said, though the size could change as the package is finalized, one official said...

...New details about the deal include plans to sell Iran about 70 Mi-17 helicopters and up to 60 Mi-28 attack helicopters together worth about $30 billion. That comes on top of a previously disclosed $30 billion tranche that includes 84 Sukhoi Su-30s and upgrades to older fighters in the Iranian fleet.

OK, so I've changed a few key details of the WSJ piece, which is really about a record American arms sale to Saudi Arabia.

The Atlantic has reignited the debate about the merits of pre-emptive military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities with its latest cover story, but this huge arms deal has gone largely unremarked. Had Russia in fact made such a sale to Iran, it would be seen as incredibly counter-productive and would probably harm US-Russian relations. Even rumours of the sale of purely defensive Russian surface-to-air missiles (which would only be useful for shooting down aircraft that entered Iranian airspace) are viewed with deep concern in Washington.

Yet when Washington lands a US$60 billion arms package with Riyadh, including for 84 fighter aircraft that could strike deep into Iranian territory, does anyone take a breath to think about how this might affect the regional power balance or Tehran's threat perceptions?

Just to be clear, I'm not urging sympathy for Tehran here; just empathy. When you're contemplating war, it helps to know what the other fellow is thinking.

Dr Stephan Frühling and Dr Benjamin Schreer are Lecturer and Senior Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.

Jim Molan makes good observations about our earlier post, and we welcome the opportunity to discuss the course of the Afghan war, and Australia's engagement in it.  Jim continues to do great service to the Australian debate by highlighting the tactical and operational aspects and limits of Australian coalition contributions.

However, his critique of our argument lacks what is essential to strategy: political context. Without it, any discussion of strategy is meaningless, because it is political objectives and commitments that justify and give sense to military operations. 

In 2009, months of delay in Obama's deliberations on his Afghanistan commitment demonstrated how limited was the resolve of the Administration. Last month's Kabul conference has reinforced the fact that a speedy handover has become a Western goal in its own right. And as the havoc wreaked on US and European societies by the global financial crisis becomes clearer, and savage cuts to military budgets a near certainty, there is no realistic prospect that Western leaders will mount the political will to throw their weight once again behind an unpopular, decade-long war.

In case you missed it, here's the policy recommendation that comes right at the end of Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer's post on 'Australia and the next phase in Afghanistan':

...the Australian military presence in the Middle East should be shaped to support wider US interests than only those in Afghanistan. The unresolved conflict over the Iranian nuclear program is shaping up as a major future challenge. Sending an additional frigate to participate in maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf, or deploying the new Super Hornet fighters there, would be strong signals that Australia remains willing to invest in its security relationship with the US.

Since the Americans themselves have not yet militarily escalated their disagreement with Iran, wouldn't it be a little premature for Australia to offer ships and fighter aircraft for that purpose?

And who says escalating the military confrontation is a good idea anyway? Frühling and Schreer imply that it is uncontroversial, since they move straight to a recommendation on how Australia can help the Americans to intimidate Iran. But maybe, instead of unquestioningly 'investing in the security relationship', our role could be to talk the Americans out of a huge mistake.

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defence.

Last week The Guardian reported that the UK Government has changed its policy on nuclear commerce with India, and will now supply civil nuclear technology and expertise to India.

Since the US agreed to do the same in 2005 (obtaining a waiver from Nuclear Suppliers' Group guidelines prohibiting nuclear transfers to countries which are not members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty), the world's nuclear supplier nations have been all to keen to sell their wares. The UK is the latest among civil nuclear suppliers to pave the way to nuclear business with Delhi – following the US, Russia, France, Canada, South Korea and, in the past month, Japan. Australia remains firmly off this list after Kevin Rudd cancelled the Howard Government's plans to sell uranium to India.

Nuclear cooperation deals are interesting creatures, motivated as much by politics as economics, and this is certainly the case with India. The Bush Administration argued that the US-India deal would help to bring India into the nonproliferation regime, implicitly questioning the central role played by the NPT in determining who was inside the tent and who was out.

Critics argued that the US should have extracted more concessions from India. If India was going to get the same access to technology as NPT members, it should have to make the same commitments as a Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT – why should other states stay in the treaty regime if a non-member gets the benefits without the responsibilities?

A bit like Zhou Enlai's famous quip that it was too early to tell the impact of the French Revolution two centuries after it occurred, it is still to early to tell the consequences of the US-India nuclear deal for the non-proliferation regime.

Congratulations to TIME magazine for its cover photo of an Afghan girl who, last year, had her nose and ears cut off by her husband. A Taliban judge ordered the punishment after the 18-year old ran away from her husband's home (here's the accompanying TIME story).

Critics of the Afghanistan war (like me) need to confront the fact that bringing the troops home is likely to lead to a great deal more misery for the people of Afghanistan.

Hizbullah, always keen to maintain its reputation as first and foremost a Lebanese nationalist resistance movement, is facing increasing difficulty in maintaining this fig leaf of respectability in the complex sectarian political terrain of Lebanon.

The latest, and most serious challenge to this claim is the prospect of having some of its members indicted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) for involvement in the 2005 assassination of five time prime minister Rafiq Hariri.

Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah gave a pre-emptive press conference on the issue on Thursday at which he advised the audience that Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri had told him of the likelihood of the STL charging Hizbullah members, but that the prime minister would acknowledge that the members were ‘rogue’ elements.

Hizbullah has been quick to deny involvement in the assassination, for it well knows the implications were such a claim to be alleged, let alone proven and Nasrallah has been busy using the media to press his case that it is all a conspiracy. In particular Hizbullah has sought to discredit the basis on which the investigation claims they were involved; cell phone records implicating Hizbullah members in the assassination.

The recent arrest of three members of the Alfa mobile phone company on suspicion of spying for Israel provides the perfect excuse — data manipulation by Israel designed to deliberately implicate Hizbullah members.

While no indictments have been issued, there is good reason for Hizbullah’s leadership to be nervous. Having crossed a long-term self-imposed ‘red line’ in May 2008 by taking up arms against fellow Lebanese with its takeover of West Beirut, any credible accusation that they were involved in the assassination of the Sunni prime minister will have long-term national and regional political and sectarian consequences.

Yes, it's now official. Afghan security primacy in four years' time and the west can turn off the lights (or at least dim them) and leave. For all the talk of 'conditions-based' withdrawal, a timeline had to be set at some stage for everybody's sake. And it's not as if the West hadn't been signaling its intent for some time.  The Dutch are to withdraw this year, the Canadians next, while the newly-elected UK prime minister said that he wanted all British troops out by 2015. Even Australia tentatively outlined a timetable of between two and four years by which time it would be able to leave Oruzgun in Afghan hands.  So 2014 certainly ticks the UK and Australian boxes.

But realistically we are all but support players to the US, the main act in the Afghan security play.  And here the Obama Administration has been doing some shaping operations of its own. Having publicly stated that the US will begin its withdrawal of its forces in a year's time, President Obama was always going to lay himself open to accusations of a precipitous withdrawal timetable, leaving before the job was done.

So the Administration has cleverly been defining what its definition of 'getting the job done' means. If the measure of success was that defined by President Bush as recently as four years ago,  with Afghanistan following Iraq as the beacons of West Asian democratic flowering, then forces would still be there for decades with no guarantee of success. 

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Will Clegg is defence and foreign affairs correspondent for Government magazine.

In answer to Olivia Kember's question, I have indeed read the books I referred to in my original riposte. And although I didn't refer to Kilcullen's guide for tactical-level commanders, 28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency, I'm glad to comment on it. Before doing so, it is important to focus on what this debate is about.

My riposte rejected Jason Thomas' claim that 'defeating an insurgency requires a massive social re-engineering and a rebuilding of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs'. This claim mattered because, as Sam argued, if true, it would highlight a hubris at the centre of our Afghan campaign. Hubris would be sufficient reason to withdrawal most of our forces from Afghanistan (we all agree massive social re-engineering is impossible, so why even bother) and would nail the lid on the coffin of counter-insurgency theory (if counter-insurgency requires the impossible, it would obviously be a stupid theory of war).

Given the extreme nature of Jason's claim, and the fact that we have defeated insurgencies in the past (tactically, operationally, and sometimes strategically), I brushed off some work I did a little while ago to construct a contrary case.

The concept of 'social re-engineering', massive or otherwise, is at the crux of this debate. If the term is defined to include any attempt to change behaviour, it is rendered meaningless and Jason's claim transforms into a truism, so we need to be more specific than that. I define 'social re-engineering' as an attempt to change a society's fabric, comprised of the norms and customs that shape perceptions and practices of political power.

Major Gen (Retd) Jim Molan is author of Running the War in Iraq.

John Faulkner is considered to be a good man, but does that make him a good Minister for Defence?

His speech at Lowy Institute last week could have been an opportunity to make a detailed explanation of the major part of his portfolio, the war in Afghanistan. He had the venue and he had the time. He elected not to. His speech was relatively short, it avoided the issues, it contained generalisations and non-sequiturs, and it tried to give the impression of addressing the hard questions while squibbing it. It was, in fact, very similar to his statements on the same subject to the Senate.

The debate is simplistically seen by the Minister as having two extremes: those who say that we should leave Afghanistan and step back from our alliance with the US (definitely not me) and those who say that our commitment should be significantly increased – 'some say to as many as 6000 troops'. There is a vague chance that this refers to me!

Having characterised this as 'extreme', the Minister then dismisses such a view without addressing the issue. Our commitment 'is both substantial and appropriate', asserts the Minister, with the next sentence pointing out that we are the largest non-NATO contributor to ISAF and the 10th largest contributor overall.

Let me summarise my views on the '6000 troops' issue, the one subject the Minister seemed to be citing me on; readers can then decide if my views are 'extreme'.

Whit Mason is a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute. In a speech to the Lowy Institute last Friday, Defence Minister John Faulkner criticised Whit's recent opinion piece in The Australian. There was then an exchange between Whit and the Minister in the Q&A portion of the speech; listen here.

I would like to clarify that I never wrote – and have never thought – that Australia's commitment in Afghanistan was 'laughable in our partners' eyes'. As I said in my reply at the Lowy Institute, I have a extremely positive impression of the ADF, and have never met anyone in Afghanistan who does not share that. 

Having said all this, with minor qualifications, I stand by the points I actually made in my opinion piece:

1. Australia could take the lead in Oruzgan, thus 'owning something' and raising the perceived significance of its contribution, with few if any extra resources.
2. Australia's Special Forces need permission from the CDF to operate outside Oruzgan or contiguous districts of northern Kandahar province, which reduces their agility and effectiveness.
3. Trainers aren't allowed to accompany the Afghan troops they're training. I should have been more precise: they aren't allowed to accompany them as a matter of course. I did not mean to suggest that the Government could not give and had not ever given permission for the trainers to go along in particular instances. I believe it is true that they did not accompany them on the Marja campaign in Helmand, and that this will not be helpful to their rapport with the Afghans.
4. Most importantly, I believe that, with minor adjustments, Australia could significantly raise its profile in the eyes of the US and other allies, which is the single most important reason Australia is in Afghanistan. My own impression from having worked in Afghanistan for the past two years – during most of which time I was based in Kandahar City and frequently visited the Dutch/Australian base in Tarin Kowt  – is that Australia does not get the recognition it deserves. I have heard the same from Australian officers and others who have served in Afghanistan.

Will Clegg is a research analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Defense and Foreign Affairs correspondent for Government magazine. The views expressed here are his alone:

I'm very interested to see Sam Roggeveen concurring with Jason Thomas' assessment that 'defeating an insurgency requires a massive (program of) social re-engineering and a rebuilding of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs'.

None of the authors who contributed to this very well regarded volume came to that conclusion, nor did counterinsurgents such as Galula, Trinquier, Kilcullen, Kitson, or Thompson. In each case, more modest and more effective means of countering insurgencies are proposed, and most of the authors write with the authority of first-hand experience. This excellent academic study of civil war also found that support for counterinsurgents is generated without any form of 're-engineering' at all.

On the basis of what evidence did Sam come to support Jason Thomas' conclusion? I don't think many would seriously argue that counterinsurgency looks like this.

A broader comment about The Interpreter's treatment of the war in Afghanistan and counterinsurgency war. Readers could be excused for thinking that Sam has created a straw man out of counterinsurgency theory and the ISAF campaign plan, which Sam heroically sticks his rhetorical bayonet into time and again.

Defence Minister John Faulkner has just left the Lowy Institute, having delivered a speech about Afghanistan. A transcript will be posted as soon as possible, and there will be audio and video available next week.

Afghanistan has hotted up as a debate topic on The Interpreter just lately (and there is much more to come), so I used the contributions we have received from Soldier Z and Soldier X in my question to Senator Faulkner. In their posts, Z and X both lamented the lack of strategic guidance from Government. These are the lines I quoted back to the Minister. Here's Z:

Curious Australians, however, will not find any substantive written policy statement on Afghanistan in the public domain...Australian policy for Afghanistan has been made by press conference and press release, first by Howard and then mimicked by Rudd in 2009.

And this is X:

We are soldiers, and we are asking to be led. We have chosen this life, and when directed, we shall go willingly to war. We recognise that every time we enter combat we may not be valiantly defending Australian soil. But if we are to stand in the dust; if we are to take life and have it taken from us; and if we are to bury our friends; then all we ask is that our government articulate its strategy and lead us.

I asked the Minister if the Government had any plans to release a comprehensive national strategy statement on Afghanistan. While he never directly answered this question, it is fair to say that his response was passionate. He pointed in particular to his regular Ministerial Statements to the parliament, which he described as 'comprehensive, substantial, detailed and frank'. He also described his commitment to openness and transparency, and argued that, as Defence Minister, he had set standards in this area that were likely to be maintained by the next minister.

There's much more to say about the speech, including on a terse exchange between Faulkner and the Lowy Institute's Whit Mason, regarding this op-ed about the ADF's rules of engagement in Afghanistan. More on that soon.

John Hardy is a PhD student in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU:

Ashley Townshend offers three reasons for Australia's continued involvement in Afghanistan: alliance management, the preservation of a global rules-based order and the negative regional and global consequences of a failed Afghan state. None of which, individually or in total, provide a compelling case to stay.

Ashley's first reason is the strongest. Alliance management is very important to Australia as we derive a great deal of benefit from our relationship with America. The alliance allows Australia to maintain a technological and intelligence lead in our region that we could not afford to acquire ourselves. The political and economic utility of the alliance is also very important to Canberra and weighs heavily on decisions to commit troops to coalition operations.

But let's not forget that Australia has supported the US in Iraq and Afghanistan from day one. We have already demonstrated that we are a loyal and committed alliance partner. We have shed blood for the alliance despite having very little direct interest in either campaign and have loaned the US political currency in doing so.

Prakash Mirchandani is the founder of Media Gurus and a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. This is part two of a series on new media and the 'battle for Kandahar'.

Is GEN David Petraeus launching a new form of exit strategy from Kandahar and Afghanistan? Certainly the blogosphere seems to think so. In a charge led by Stars and Stripes, the view is: 'Unable so far to turn the tide against the Taliban in any decisive fashion, U.S. troops and the Afghan government are increasingly looking to local militias to provide security for their villages, especially in rural areas, to keep the insurgents from gaining more ground.'

Roland Paris suggests there is no other way out: 'One way of analyzing the Afghan mission is to see it as an interaction between two concurrent time-lines:  (1) the dwindling time that the Obama Administration and American public may be willing to maintain large numbers of forces in Afghanistan, and (2) the still-considerable time required to train and equip Afghan security forces that are capable of taking over most of the counterinsurgency effort.'

Several bloggers quote the Washington Post that President Hamid Karzai is strongly resisting the growth of such militias, which could line up against him after NATO and the Americans depart. However, rumours are growing that some form of agreement will be reached with the Afghan President.

That such a US departure is being planned, and that GEN Petraeus has to stem the perception that this is so, is reflected in Abu Muquwama's musing:

The death of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah last week brought out tens of thousands of people to his funeral in Beirut, giving an indication of his following in the country. Those who have since spoken well of him, such as the British ambassador to Lebanon and the CNN editor Octavia Nasr, have respectively had their knuckles rapped or been sacked. I will just say that the man did definitely exude a sense of gravitas (and was extremely well protected) when I interviewed him as part of my academic research in 2008.

More importantly, his death opens a window into the complex world of Shi'a Islamic jurisprudence, particularly what occurs on the death of such a highly regarded marja', or source of emulation. We can roughly equate the relationship between the Pope and observant Catholics to that which a grand marja' has with his followers — both are regarded as infallible in their interpretations of God's will and there is thus a binding unwritten agreement between followers and the guide to trust in his wisdom.

There the similarities end, however. While there is only one Pope, there are several marja', and observant Shi'a are free to switch between marja' as they see fit or even to follow different marja', depending on the subject matter. This marja' for political issues and that one for social policy matters, for example.

One's choice of marja' depends on a number of things; your view of his level of learning, the topics he discusses, his political leanings, his ethnicity. Fadlallah, as the only Lebanese marja', naturally attracted support from Lebanese Shi'a both at home and among the diasporic community (including in Australia). But he was also popular with youth and women because of his willingness to address practical contemporary topics and issue fatawa (religious opinions) about women's rights, smoking and medical research, topics that more conservative clerics steered away from.

Following the death of Private Nathan Bewes, the sixth Australian soldier to be killed in Afghanistan in little over a month, the public is again asking what the war is all about.

Reacting to these concerns, Prime Minister Julia Gillard has trundled out a familiar policy one-liner, declaring that 'Our objective is clear: to combat the threat of international terrorism, to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a training ground for terrorists launching attacks against us and our allies'.

Such cursory remarks about Australia's 'war on terror' do not amount to a clear articulation of this country's strategic objectives. As Soldier Z and Peter Leahy have argued, Australia urgently needs a public debate about our national interests in Afghanistan. Before the Government decides to either withdraw the troops, stay the course or offer more than a 'token' contribution to fighting in Oruzgan, the Australian public must be told why we are there and what interests are at stake.

So what are Australia's reasons for being in Afghanistan? It seems to me that there are three good answers.

First, Australia has an interest in supporting the American alliance. Although our forces play an important role in ISAF's state-building and counter-insurgency mission, providing political support for 'America's war' is by far the most salient reason for our presence. Nor should the Government be shy about this fact. Maintaining the alliance is prudent foreign policy. It offers benefits like sensitive technology and high-value intelligence; and would be indispensable in the defence of Australia.

Little noticed in Australia was the inaugural Arab League Pacific Islands summit held in Abu Dhabi in late June.

This earlier post highlighted the UAE's interest in the South Pacific in trying to secure votes for its candidacy to house the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi – a bid that was ultimately successful.

The UAE has followed up on its initial engagement with the region by convening the forum in Abu Dhabi. Such follow-up accords with the Emiratis' desire to raise its international diplomatic profile, albeit in a more measured and less aggressive manner than its Gulf neighbour Qatar.

The benefits of engaging with the island states was apparent from the joint communiqué issued at the end of the summit. For its part, the UAE gained Pacific islands endorsement for its call to Iran to undertake negotiations to resolve the 'three islands dispute', and support for the creation of a nuclear free zone within the Middle East (aimed at both Iran and Israel).

For their part, the Pacific Islands were able to stake their claims for Pacific Partnership funding from the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, as the prime minister of the Solomons noted. Fiji's prime minister called for a permanent Gulf presence in the region and even managed to get in a not so subtle dig at Australia when he asked those assembled to 'recognise the point of differential between the small Pacific island developing states and the metropolitan powers in the Pacific region'.

Australia already has a robust relationship with the UAE, given the number of Australian companies operating and expats living there, the fact that it is one of our top 20 international trading partners, and because it plays host to our regional military headquarters. The UAE's increasing interest in the Pacific Island states now gives us a common interest in our, as opposed to their, backyard.

Photo by Flickr user Daniel Y. Go, used under a Creative Commons license.

Dr Stephan Frühling is a lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.

President Obama's Afghanistan surge is now halfway between its announcement in December 2009 and the next major review planned for December 2010. With growing unease about the war in the US and allied countries, it is not too early to ask how the war is going.

Additional US forces allow the coalition to contest Taliban control in more areas. A special forces campaign is beginning to seriously wear down the Taliban leadership. And some local Afghan tribes are openly revolting against the Taliban. 

But while violence in Afghanistan is not uncontrollable, it is also not being controlled. Coalition losses are still rising. Reforms to the Afghan police and army are too recent to judge their success. And a long-awaited civilian governance offensive in Kandahar remains delayed.

The picture is decidedly mixed, but two especially problematic issues have already become obvious.

First, Obama's July 2011 deadline for the beginning of the US withdrawal has put everyone on notice that they need to hedge their bets. Inevitable questions about US resolve have made it demonstrably harder for the US and its coalition partners to convince regional actors to throw their lot behind the anti-Taliban forces: from the Government of Pakistan to Karzai's regime and its cronies to illiterate farmers in remote mountain valleys. 

Second, the working relationships between military and civilian leaders of the US effort, and with the Afghan Government, are visibly damaged.

It is striking to hear an Indian analyst identify why India should take a leading role in cooperating with China in the Indian Ocean, a line contrary to some of the more defensive and fearful arguments coming out of New Delhi's security commentariat. 

'The Indian Ocean: Navigating Beyond Rivalry' was the topic of the Lowy Institute's fourth annual Australia-India Strategic Lecture, held last week in Perth. The speaker was Siddharth Varadarajan, strategic affairs editor of The Hindu newspaper and one of India's sharpest foreign policy commentators and thinkers.

We will be posting the full text of the lecture on the Lowy Institute website soon, but in the meantime, here's an interview I recorded with Mr Varadarajan, capturing some of the key arguments as well as some perceptive thoughts on the Australia-India relationship.

Whether one entirely agrees with Varadarajan or not, there are some refreshing counterpoints here and in the longer lecture to claims aired famously last year in an over-rated essay by Robert Kaplan that the region is doomed to rivalry.

I should add that holding the lecture in Perth was a deliberate step by the Lowy Institute towards developing a more active profile in Western Australia, a state which, with its massive resource exports, has a more direct stake than any other part of Australia in economic and strategic ties with Asian powers. 

We acknowledge the support of the Australia-India Council in bringing the speaker to Australia, and of the Australian Institute for International Affairs (WA branch) and Australia-India Business Council (WA chapter) in helping to make the well-attended lecture such a success.

James Brown is a former Australian Army officer and former Lowy Institute intern. He is holidaying in the Middle East.

Hezbollah put this billboard up yesterday at the Baalbek historical site in the Bekaa Valley. The guy in the photo is their dear leader Nasrullah.

Warren Reed writes:

I don't know whether this reply will get through in your system but I want to tell you (as a former National Serviceman in the Australian Army) that I think Soldier Z's letter is brilliant. It's exquisitely articulated, is succinct in the extreme and expresses the sentiments of so many men and women serving overseas in this country's name. Perhaps you could get a federal politician (Bob Brown, Nick Xenophon?) to table it in the new parliament when it meets after the election.

Soldier Z is a serving member of the ADF with operational experience in Afghanistan.

This June, Australians were confronted with the return of five of its young treasures, killed in action fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Again, and in increasing numbers, Australians are asking why their sons are dying in a foreign land for a cause which is little understood and with apparently scant prospect for victory.

Why are we fighting in Afghanistan? What is our policy?

Committing the nation to war is a grave decision for any government. Accompanying any decision to fight, you would expect, is a detailed and publicly-accessible policy underpinning the campaign and stating national objectives.

Curious Australians, however, will not find any substantive written policy statement on Afghanistan in the public domain. Recent governments have actively sought to minimise public attention about our involvement. Australian policy for Afghanistan has been made by press conference and press release, first by Howard and then mimicked by Rudd in 2009. The recent press conference by Defence Minister John Faulkner is the latest contribution-by-sound-bite.

Holistically, this indicates a lack of focus and rigour by government, our military leadership and policymakers. It affirms a perception that all Australia is seeking in Afghanistan is to 'look good, not do good'.