Second, yes there is a high desertion rate among Afghan soldiers. There were also desertion rates among some American Revolutionary War regiments — as high as 50%. Worse, a number of mutinies occurred that nearly broke Washington's Continental Army – something that Generals Clinton, Burgoyne, and Cornwallis could not achieve on the battlefield. NATO's Combined Action Campaign — which was started here in Regional Command (East) last year — has gone to great lengths to help reform the leadership, living conditions, and pay of the Afghan soldiers.

In the end, desertion rates are not necessarily the only indicator of how an Army will fare against an insurgent or conventional opponent. And in fact, Rodger's revelation that Afghan National Army pay and conditions are comparatively poor (certainly worse than what is at times offered by the insurgents!) is an indicator that there is obviously something else motivating people to join the government’s side.

Finally, it should be noted that recent surveys taken here among the Afghan population show more support for the Army than any other institution in Afghanistan. This support could be an ominous sign of things to come (noting how the Pakistan public's high support for their military has led to a number of coups when the civilian leadership has been weak). Even so, the fact remains that throughout the Afghanistan I walk in and fly over, there are tribal elders, Mullahs and families encouraging their sons and some daughters to join the ANA. This is a trend that can only be a change for good in this devastated nation.

PS: I termed Guevara as a 'Caribbean' version of the Taliban because that is where he exercised most of his ideological campaign (see Nick Caistor's work here as a helpful synopsis for those who missed out on that particular seven years of Che's life). And while patently there are differences between the two, the similarity I chose to highlight was that both peddle oppressive regimes that are comprehensively intolerant of alternative views.

Photo by Flickr user DVIDSHUB, used under a Creative Commons license.

These heroes of Afghanistan are not alone in this fight, as they serve side-by-side with their NATO partners. While both share the same dangers and victories, there is one stark difference that separates the average Afghan warrior from his Coalition partners – NATO and U.S. soldiers will return home to places like the United States or France; the Afghan soldier is in this fight for the long haul where the majority have fought for close to eight years. These are the real freedom fighters of Afghanistan.

The image of Private Naqibulah reminds me of another so-called “Freedom Fighter” whose face has seen resurgence among well- and not so well-dressed fashionistas, rock stars, and college students of our society – the infamous and iconic image of the 1960s terrorist, Che Guevara. 

If you have never heard of Che, a failed Argentine medical student who embraced the discredited ideologies of Socialist philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels while traveling through South America in the 1950s, you’ve most likely seen his face on T-shirts and posters in college dorms across the country. He has been most recently lionized in movies like ‘Evita’ and ‘The Motorcycle Diaries’ as a traveling crusader for the oppressed; however, the truth of Che is a lot darker. While many associate Che as a symbol of youthful expression, his image, in fact, represents a man who tried to ban free expression, and particularly, musical expression such as rock music and jazz music because he thought it was imperialist. He was the Caribbean equivalent of the Taliban. He enforced a single moralistic viewpoint; and if you didn't agree with him, you would be killed.

Che’s own words belie his misguided attempts at changing the world. The words: “The U.S. is a great enemy of mankind! Against those hyenas, there is no option but extermination.” are not those of Osama Bin Laden; they are Che’s visions, which pre-empted al-Qaeda by 40 years.

For my money, if you want to wear a T-shirt or hang a poster in your room of a true “Freedom Fighter” and “Revolutionary” doing battle against the forces of evil – embrace the image of Private Naqibulah, a true hero in the eyes of his family and the people of Afghanistan!

Some readers might still hold to more romantic ideas of Che Guevara. The point my colleague makes is that those Afghans joining the various services of their government — not just military, but police and civil — are doing so because they have a vision of revolutionising their society, from one of oppression to one that strives for a better future.

These nations have insufficient resources to patrol all of their reef space: few surface patrol vessels, minimal if any maritime aerial surveillance, and challenges in networking and information technology. Many of the world's other reefs have been irreparably damaged, meaning the Pacific has global importance at a time when parts of it have the highest proportion of species facing extinction.

And even with cooperative approaches under frameworks like the Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreements (as reaffirmed by Pacific Island Forum members at Cairns last year), there are simply too few resources to protect everything. Research such as this could help prioritise the scant assets available for protecting those reefs that are the 'key terrain' of marine ecology.

This is not simply neighbourly bonhomie: a collapse in the biodiversity of a neighbouring marine space could remove a vital hatchery, breeding site or migratory stage point in marine food chains that reach Australia. It's therefore in our direct interest to help in preventing such collapses.

The study by Dr Jones and her colleagues analysed the survival and propagation potential of specific corals and their zooxanthellae symbionts, determining which offered the best investment for future-proofing the wider reef's viability. I was engrossed by the biochemistry behind the work (see articles here and here for background) but the important point here is the policy implications.

Changes in temperature, acidification and dissolved inorganic nitrogen from land runoff continue to occur at unprecedented rates (it's the rate of change, not the magnitude, that makes such changes a killer). By isolating and comparing select criteria that determine which coral reef areas are most resilient to change in environmental conditions, and which are the most diverse and productive, the research offers a solid scientific basis for Australia's international partners to prioritise resources and protect reefs that will act as 'stationary arks' for a climatically grim future. 

As a focus for development assistance, Australia could do much worse than to provide funding, expertise and technical support on marine refuge analysis to nations whose sustainability as viable countries might depend on it.

Initiatives of this style could offer as many opportunities for host country development as for the Australian participants, by deepening the research base and generic understanding. Initiatives could be conducted with other bodies that have a related focus, such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the Nouméa-based Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, and the Forum Fisheries Agency. 

The Asian Development Bank-Global Environment Facility's joint-sponsored Coral Triangle Initiative, or perhaps even the Pacific Patrol Boat Program might assist in take-up and broadening the investment return.

Photo, of a researcher in the Keppel Region, Great Barrier Reef, courtesy Dr A Jones, CQU.

• Australia's maritime strategy, as recently described in the 2009 Defence White Paper, acknowledges the amphibious nature of the many security missions likely to occur in the littoral, along Australia's coastlines and beyond. Five of our nearest neighbours (Indonesia, Philippines, the Solomons, PNG and Fiji) together comprise over 25,000 islands.
• As humans increasingly occupy, urbanise and exploit the littoral, it will become pivotal to the interests of nations and the global community. Yet threats are growing in those same areas. Criminal acts, sovereignty threats, and blends of both will test the national security and law enforcement abilities of Australia and its neighbours in the littoral.
• The scale of increase in Australia's amphibious capability (see graphic above) is difficult to grasp: simply as a raw tonnage comparison, our present amphibious capacity totals just over 27,000 tonnes – dwarfed by the nearly 80,000 tonne aggregate by around 2020. The two future amphibious ships – the LHDs – will far outstrip the current two ships, and even our last aircraft carrier.
• Australia's future actions in the littorals won't be limited to inserting combat forces during a conflict. Rapid response to humanitarian events and disasters – aid, evacuation, reconstruction and sustainment — will be important, while providing a reassuring security presence or demonstration of national intent will remain as valuable as ever.
• Other scenarios might involve the amphibious delivery of development assistance such as stores, equipment and people. But an amphibious vessel is no cruise ship, and any personnel – government or civilian — operating from them will need specialised preparation and training.
• Opposition in the littoral environment might comprise not only conventional military but also irregular adversaries, both state and non-state, as seen in insurgent operations around Mindanao in the Philippines, piracy off Somalia and in the Malacca Straits, and the surprisingly sophisticated operations of the Tamil Sea Tigers off Sri Lanka. Our police and other law enforcement agencies therefore need to be capable of operating in the littoral – both independently and in concert with military and other government actors.

The amphibious capability development on which Australia has embarked embodies the ongoing shift from a reactionary defensive posture of Australia as a continent to one of 'grasping the nettle' of Australia’s littorals and beyond. It will also redefine the way Australia applies its instruments of national power and engagement to future national security challenges.

Image courtesy of the Department of Defence.

• Over 70% of coalition casualties in Afghanistan – and a similar proportion for Afghan government personnel – occur from IED attack. As a weapon of increasing lethality and ubiquity, the IED is here to stay.  Moreover, insurgents will continue to employ them to target security forces and government workers. Importantly, evidence and events in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere show that the IED threat goes beyond foreign coalition forces — even if coalition forces leave, the IEDs won't necessarily stop. 
• Attacking the insurgent networks that produce and employ the devices is where the 'smart money' is – answering the questions of who, why, where and when has far greater payoff than simply defeating device after device.
• The forensic, clinical approach employed now to collect intelligence and do analysis is a fundamental part of attacking the IED networks – akin to a chilling crossover of CSI, Silent Witness and Wire in the Blood. This takes an immense degree of skill and training, inestimable courage and judicious answers to the commander's dilemma of collecting vital intelligence while keeping soldiers' safety paramount.
• The permeation of ideas, technology and adaptation of the IED threat occurs globally, at times exploiting purpose-built networks but often employing business and finance channels. I've drawn attention to this lethal osmosis previously, and it's important to understand the potential for similar threats to eventuate both domestically and in Australia's region. We have been relatively fortunate, but we are not immune.
• Countering the IED threat can be characterised as involving 60% training, 30% equipment, and 10% mastering the 'X' factor of nerveless adaptation to the unpredictable and unprecedented. So, while the kit is important, the training as an individual and as a team is easily more than half the battle. Critically, this applies beyond the military to local government agencies, foreign development assistance teams, NGOs and initiatives such as Australia's new Deployable Civilian Capacity. This is a crucial lesson that should not be learned again the hard way. Preliminary training at the professional development, pre-deployment and in-theatre stages are all needed to prepare personnel to manage the IED threat in the field. Developing and maintaining a cooperative approach between organisations is equally important.

As if to embody the importance of sharing and cooperation in this space, Brigadier Winter's presentation was attended by over a dozen senior Iraqi police commanders, here to work with the Australian Institute of Police Management. Multi-agency and multilateral coordination to stem and remove these 'evil flowers' is occurring and ongoing, but more can be done to share between nations and between government, private and non-government organisations, to stay alive and to contribute to attacking the IED networks.

Photo by Flickr user United Nations Photo, used under a Creative Commons license.

Take, for example the mission, 'Clear the enemy from Hill 101 in order to secure the adjacent bridgehead'. If, in the meantime, the enemy has left Hill 101 and occupied the nearby Hill 102, the first part of the mission may be much easier, but the second part is by no means assured!

Missions articulated like this clearly have a better likelihood of success, but only if subordinate units are adroit and flexible enough to adapt in performing their sub-tasks as situations change – hence the Australian Army's current focus on adaptiveness.

However, applying swarming tactics to military operations has been plagued by technical feasibility and conceptual limitations. How to develop multiple subordinate entities capable of comprehending a single overarching task, parsing it, and then acting autonomously — yet collectively and selflessly — on their part of the mission?

One of the biggest impediments has been that humans are actually too intelligent and individual in their approach to problem resolution to employ swarming as a tactic.

Now, advances in artificial intelligence and creativity are seeing machines composing their own, highly complex responses to their environment. Simultaneously, advances in reliability of solar technology in marine craft, and ruggedness, power and compactness of renewables in general allow for longer missions over greater distances. As noted in 'Sailing in Sunshine' in the Australian Geographic's latest issue (see solar Sydney Harbour ferry, left), the US Navy is considering applying this technology to multiple small vessels.

Likewise, the BBC and ABC recently carried reports on the progress in robotics – including towards flying bug-sized surveillance devices (see Scientific American video, above).

What this means is that for certain missions – especially ones involving high rates of repetition, predictiveness and endurance – the problematic human component in swarming can be circumvented. For the maritime and littoral environments (although it's also applicable over land) the door is wide open to field swarms of uninhabited aerial and surface (and, further out, sub-surface) vehicles without remote piloting. Such vehicles would be able to respond intelligently, collaboratively and autonomously to perform common missions such as maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, hydrography and even simple replenishment tasks.

Without the need for crew or a remote pilot relying on bandwidth-constrained situational awareness, these vehicles' sizes can be reduced enormously. Teamed with vastly improved autonomy from onboard renewable energy sources such as solar PV, the range, endurance, performance and payload can be increased accordingly, achieving very attractive economies of scale.

There's no doubt that there will remain important limitations for such swarms, especially wherever human intuition and judgment is needed. However, with 11% of the Earth’s surface to patrol, resources becoming scarcer and population movements likely to continue to increase, the use of solar-powered swarming as part of Australia's national security solution would seem a worthy one.

Photo by Flickr user Tilly Dog Fauxtografix, used under a Creative Commons license.

Little known due to wartime censorship, this action was a small, albeit important step towards eventual victory for the Allies.

The presence of HMAS Adelaide during the ‘rallying’ of New Caledonia to Free France undoubtedly ensured the action’s success. Had New Caledonia remained Vichy by the time Japan had entered the war, its potential role as a forward base for Japanese operations would have undoubtedly changed the course, and possibly the outcome of the Pacific War.

Since her annexation in 1853, Australian perceptions of New Caledonia have continued to ebb and surge, yet New Caledonia's geo-strategic significance to Australia’s north-eastern approaches and her recurrent role in Australian regional foreign policy remains unchanged, even today.

Yet we often seem to overlook the existence of New Caledonia and all its complexities, to our mutual disadvantage. The ethnic Kanak population constitute a sizeable proportion of wider Melanesia, and their story — past, present and future — is germane to the rest of the South Pacific community.

The substantial, high-quality scientific research and development conducted in New Caledonia into the environment, natural resources, energy and climate all has relevance to the wider Pacific.

From a security perspective, our EEZs are contiguous, and French military, maritime, intelligence and border security capabilities represent considerable potential for even deeper and broader cooperation than present.

The selective blindness isn’t all one way either. Caledonian obliviousness or diffidence to many initiatives and programs here in Australia and elsewhere in the Pacific is equally puzzling, and shouldn’t only be put down to a language barrier.

New Caledonia’s decision on its political future (see Denise Fisher’s post) is important not just for its inhabitants but also for the region. However, our collective inability to have a universally sophisticated engagement with its people and government — one that transcends its political circumstances — unnecessarily hinders our own ability to resolve many of the twenty-first century challenges facing the South Pacific region. On both sides of the Coral Sea, we can do better.

The historical datapoints in this post are drawn from a previous article published in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute: 'An Expedition in Regime Change: Australia’s party to the Ralliement of New Caledonia during World War II'. Image reproduced with kind permission from the Sea Power Centre Australia.

Last week's Northern Ireland example, as with earlier incidents in January and May this year, demonstrates traits that seem to come from non-Irish sources. Similarly, evidence is amassing (eg. here, here,  here and here) that violent extremist groups elsewhere are searching globally for new ways of conducting their activities, and not simply doing what has always been done in following or evolving their own historical 'doctrine'.

This is a wakeup call for those who consider that such threats are unlikely to proliferate beyond particular ideologies, societies or cultures. Violent groups are not limited to established methods of inflicting violence and will use the tools at their fingertips through globalisation to learn about and adopt 'best practices'.

Photo by Flickr user The Revolution, used under a Creative Commons license.

• As a key exporter in this field, who will become relatively more important as a trade partner?  
• What will be our capacity to safeguard that supply from being cut or interfered with?
• As energy mixes change dramatically in countries 'going nuclear', how will this alter their economic and development profile? Do they become competitors, better partners or an increased burden through venture failure?
• How will Australia's stance on nuclear non-proliferation be challenged as dozens of countries deepen their industrial and scientific capacities in nuclear physics and engineering? 
• As a source of nuclear fuel — and by extension of nuclear waste — how does Australia's responsibility change with increased use of nuclear power?
• Have we thought enough about the nexus between carbon emissions and adoption of nuclear energy in rapidly accelerating economies? Should Australia be helping to speed its development in nations that have elected to go nuclear?

While the Government’s Future Directions Paper on energy — the precursor to its Energy White Paper scheduled for the end of the year – briefly notes nuclear energy, it predicts oil, coal and natural gas are likely to remain the main fuel sources used globally to 2030. Given the pace of change demonstrated in this and other recent articles, nuclear energy's importance to world economies, world environment and world security would appear too stark for such forecasts to remain valid for very long. Feeding the world's reactors will demand a comprehensive approach in Australian policy.

Photo by Flickr user Die Jugend, used under a Creative commons license.

These challenges are compounded where there is little in the way of indigenous energy sources – like virtually all of the Pacific island states. The Cook Islands, for instance, are about ninety percent dependent on imported refined petroleum fuels. (Surfing the Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) website is a great way of reinforcing how comparatively vulnerable countries like Australia aren’t in terms of energy security.)

Physical security and legitimacy of local governance also link with energy security in developing states. Where local or tribal leaders are part of energy provision to communities, this provides a reciprocally supporting arrangement. National or state-owned 'macro-grid' solutions for energy provision are already hobbled by the topography, bureaucratic incapacity and lack of investment capital, but can also weaken the social contract between local leaders and the people who look to them. 

By contrast, locally provided energy can reinforce key local polities and garner buy-in from the populace to guard such 'micro-grid' generators, whether from insurgents or natural effects. Local energy generation systems also provide redundancy and community resilience against catastrophic power failure from larger grids with fewer power sources.

Renewable energy has advantages in such circumstances — it is often small scale, modular and relative simple. Granted, renewables also have drawbacks — difficulty in technology transfer and relatively high unit cost (as noted here) — but these are surmountable through well-targeted policy. Australia’s government — and the industry itself — is as of yesterday in a strong position to reconsider its development assistance strategies towards renewable and sustainable energy.

Such a change of direction has clear advantages, many of which were recommendations from the recent Lowy Institute Pacific Islands and the World Conference:

• The vulnerability and energy dependency of Pacific states on imported fossil fuels is reduced, enhancing state viability.
• Multi-sector (ie. government, business and civil society) partnerships are encouraged through support for microcredit initiatives.
• Positive elements of traditional society and leadership are strengthened.
• Australian renewable energy industry diversity and depth is increased through research and development, technology investment and supply. 
• Development partner societies become more resilient, thereby reducing likelihood or need for future direct Australian intervention.

Oh, by the way – the planet might just benefit as well.

Interoperability takes many forms, from common equipment and jargon to standard procedures. The most essential, however, is 'cultural' interoperability, which comes from inter-organisational understanding, trust and confidence brought about through close and ongoing training, liaison and exchanges. 

Shared learning and education delivers much of this, and the measures Defence takes — such as shared staff professional development – aim to develop a predisposition across the Services, throughout Defence and among other coalition partners to engage early. But even in Defence, the work is acknowledged as incomplete – interoperability requires constant vigilance and re-investment.

Such early engagement allows time and scope for parallel planning and understanding the capacities and limitations of the other actors. It applies equally in all national responses regardless of the type of challenge, as noted recently by the head of Victoria's bushfire recovery.

The 2008 National Security Statement’s proposals of a 'national security college' and an 'executive development program' therefore have merit. However, as pointed out in my recent Lowy Institute Analysis paper on Defence’s contribution to national security, such ventures will only be effective if their value is understood and properly invested in by all elements of the national security community, from senior leadership down.

In classical times, when one phalanx was pitted against another, the result was invariably light casualties suffered by the victor, and virtual annihilation of the vanquished. Once its protective framework was shattered or pierced by the opposition’s tactics, nothing could prevent a phalanx’s demolition.

Australia’s future national security phalanx includes not only the ADF, but also federal and state police, emergency services, Customs, the intelligence community and Foreign Affairs. Like its ancient predecessor, it must be indomitable as a whole, but the phalanx’s impermeability will nevertheless rely upon cooperation, understanding and seamless cohesion — the cultural interoperability — between its 'hoplite' agencies.

Photo by Flickr user diffendale, used under a Creative Commons license.

The diversity and provenance of these contributor nations is a telling reminder of how ‘national interest’ is not determined through geographic proximity — nor vestigial indebtedness to great powers — alone. 

Moreover, the UN had clearly been caught flat-footed, with many contingents from contributing nations slow to reach the peninsula: yet, given this issue had been an event ‘waiting to happen’ since the Second World War, one could argue that there had been a ‘strategic warning time’ of some five years!

The Korean conflict tells us that even if nations think they have the right balance for preparing between likely and grave-consequence events, national interests may dictate telescoped response times that mean ‘come as you are’ — even to events of grave consequence. My colleague’s axiom suddenly becomes clearer: and having agile force structures that can transition quickly across to roles and settings we haven’t envisaged, becomes similarly more appealing.

Lastly, it’s easy to forget that Panmunjom was just an armistice: the UN contributor nations still technically remain in a state of conflict with the DPRK…

Photo by Flickr user Locomota - M Cooper, used under a Creative Commons license.

As Collins says, 'even the most modern communications cannot relay the understanding gained when you can see and smell the battle'. A campaign’s success might well be lost at the strategic level, but it is won at the tactical, and understanding the fears, drivers and surroundings there is vital. We rely inestimably on our soldiers and other personnel to operate and win there. In turn, they need and deserve the best of leadership.

A valued American colleague gave me this insight:

Even from the cockpit of my H-60 Black Hawk helicopter, I always valued the ability to see the battlefield conditions. Having a sense of what my air crews were seeing, and using the ability to position myself forward to send a message to my aviators and crews. This was especially apparent on 7 December 2007 when I was the Air Mission Commander of the air assault to take down the Taliban held city of Musa Qala.

It is my assessment that no amount of technology can replace a commander’s presence on the battlefield. A leader, even a tactically poor commander, still has a chance of victory if he places himself in harm’s way and shows his Soldiers leadership from the front.

The dangers of such leadership extend beyond safety; there are also risks of micro-management and stifling of subordinates. So too, the balance between what might appear reckless and what is truly inspirational must be found. Yet leadership through deft and conscious personal example and placing faith in loyal subordinates through what the military terms 'mission command' are in no way mutually exclusive. Indeed, the mutual trust and confidence between leader and led that is vital in mission command is further inspired by personal example. ‘Like this, do that’ is so much more than an epithet.

Importantly, these lessons are pertinent well beyond combat, into everyday society, business and politics. Command on operations may appear a world away, but we can all inspire others by our own actions.

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defence.

This is a key development for the remote handling of highly pressure-sensitive devices like mines or IEDs, which is why Defence’s science & technology organisation has awarded a major grant to further R&D in this area.

The related domain of telerobotics is already doing great service in microsurgery, but adding a touch more ‘touch’ to the application of such technology can only improve our ability to deactivate or render safe IEDs, land mines or other explosives, rather than have a remotely controlled robot simply carry them somewhere safe or place a controlled demolition charge. 

Widespread fielding of haptic technology could have a significant impact on the ways countries provide foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, by helping to clear explosive hazards in a safe, controlled manner. Given the proliferation of such devices, anything that can avert casualties is a worthy investment.

Watch – or rather, feel – this space!

Photo courtesy of Gizmodo.

I had to shuttle continually between both HQs to present the same plan and same maps — but in two languages (thank you, PowerPoint!) and to two commanders with very different sets of perspectives. I would have had no chance without the translators and interpreters helping my Iraqi planning counterpart and me. The result was the first operations order at that level issued in both English and Arabic.

I’ve just returned from two weeks' foreign language requalification at the Defence Force School of Languages in Melbourne. Army personnel qualified in Indonesian, Arabic, Vietnamese, French, Persian Farsi, Dari and Thai are required to attend, after two years or more since their last qualification.  Japanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, Russian Portuguese, Mandarin and Filipino are also included on the schedule. Others such as Pashtu and Urdu are taught at the School, but they’re not yet on the ‘refresher’ scheme.

Further in-country immersion training broadens soldiers in the language and culture of particular regions as part of the Army’s broader language and cultural studies programme. Importantly, this programme isn’t confined to the intelligence or communications trades: anyone interacting with other cultures need some level of skills. Such skills ensure that soldiers understand the human environment they find themselves operating in, and thereby improves their tactical decisions. This applies whether on operational missions, or in engagement with Australia’s international partners. 

Australia's focus on the human dimension of conflict was recently reinforced by the White Paper announcement to allocate a further $20 million on language and cultural skills.  It’s an indication that despite the growing influence of high technology, the human dimension of the profession of arms is considered worthy of increased investment.

Finding the energy it needs now and into the future is a clear concern, including for Dr Ligia Noronha, who is in Australia in her capacity as inaugural Michael Hintze Fellow in Energy Security at the Centre for International Security Studies, at Sydney University. A Senior Fellow and Director of The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in New Delhi, Dr Noronha is addressing the question of how India’s growing energy needs are shaping its foreign, security and trade policies.

India’s scale always produces startling statistics: like how 2.8 million barrels of oil are unloaded daily into India, of which 70% is from West Asia. However, many of Dr Norohna’s points about India are also pertinent beyond the sub-continent. For any outspread populace like India’s, supply of energy across the countryside is just as challenging as sourcing it from overseas. Moreover, India is just one emerging economy whose energy demands contrast widely with those of more developed economies. In India’s case, over 700 million are dependent on traditional wood and dung biomass for energy. They must compete with a bounding hi-tech export economy that is crucial to India’s balance of payments. 

In Australia, concerns like these of strategic partners and neighbours deserve our interest, but that requires an elevated and broader energy security debate. Understanding the relationships between energy dependency, vulnerability, diversity and sustainability for each economic sector is crucial to any such debate. 

Even more important are the strategic as well as economic benefits of diversity and sustainability of energy resources. Diversity of energy sources can act as a hedge against vulnerability. Similarly, improving a sector’s sustainability through renewable sources and reducing consumption can guard against dependency upon remote and vulnerable energy sources. 

Sound ecological policy often involves investing in renewable energy and having smaller, more numerous and diverse sources of energy. In implementing those environmental policies, however, there is also the ‘accidental wisdom’ – a real serendipity — of practical and helpful international strategic policy to be realised.

Photo by Flickr user Monster, used under a Creative Commons license.