For a few hours this evening Australian time, media outlets from around the world will zoom in on Kiruna, Sweden's northernmost city of 18,000 inhabitants and host to the Arctic Council ministerial meeting. The foreign ministers of the eight Arctic Council member states – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the US – will attend the two-hour meeting, held every other year.

It is a sign of the times that the most controversial issue on the agenda will be whether China will be granted permanent observer status.

China, along with six other countries and seven organisations also vying to become permanent observers, wants to ensure that it will receive an invitation to Arctic Council meetings in future. That is the only concrete benefit permanent observers have compared to ad hoc observers. Observers do not have voting rights nor are they allowed to address the ministerial meeting.

At the last two ministerial meetings a decision about accepting new permanent observers has been postponed due to a lack of consensus among member states. Why? No official wants to say it publicly, but unofficially Arctic watchers know that it is because Russia is wary of allowing China in to one of the last forums at which Russia is not overshadowed by its former 'little brother'.

Another complication is that Canada does not want the European Union, another permanent observer applicant, to be allowed in because of their differing stances on seal hunting.

The strategic partnership between Australia and China announced yesterday has been a long 24 months in the making. As with any initiative requiring the approval of senior Chinese leaders, there have been fits and starts along the way. Less than a month ago, when the countdown to Julia Gillard's departure to China had begun, the Prime Minister's Office was still in a state of suspense. There was no certainty that the Chinese hosts were prepared to make a commitment in time before Gillard's visit to China.

When Gillard visited China for the first time as Australian prime minister in April 2011, she mentioned in passing to her hosts the need for a more structured relationship. In March 2012 she sent a letter to then-President Hu Jintao proposing that the countries solidify their relations by committing to a regular high-level dialogue. DFAT Secretary Dennis Richardson was sent to Beijing in August 2012 to follow up on the proposal. All the while, senior Australian leaders and diplomats kept the issue alive in meetings with their Chinese counterparts. The Chinese did not reject the idea but were non-committal.

China's sluggish response was presumably a result of a general slowdown in decision-making amid the leadership transition in China.

Australia's Prime Minister Julia Gillard achieved a diplomatic breakthrough in Beijing today when she and China's Premier Li Keqiang agreed that Australia and China will forge a strategic partnership. There will be an official announcement from Gillard and Premier Li in the next few hours. Consequently, the respective prime ministers will hold annual meetings and two Cabinet-level strategic dialogues will take place every year focusing on foreign policy and economics.

As I wrote in a June 2012 Lowy Institute Policy Brief, In Search of Political Trust: Australia-China Ties, Australia needs an annual structured high-level strategic and economic dialogue with China to ensure that Canberra's views are heard and taken seriously in Beijing. Australia must seek substantial political ties with China, the world's second largest economy and the country on which Australia's economic well-being is founded.

The decision to form a strategic partnership is significant. The announced partnership's architecture will facilitate regular high-level talks about both bilateral problems as well as regional issues. As I argued ten months ago, if political and strategic relations remain underdeveloped, it is conceivable that Canberra and Beijing will be unable to resolve problems within the economic relationship which inevitably emerge from time to time. Gillard has taken the first important step forward on the long march toward building political trust between the two countries.

I'll write more soon on the inside story of how this diplomatic breakthrough occurred.

Looking at the line-up of China's new leaders, two things stand out. First, Jiang Zemin, the 86-year old who was China's leader from 1989-2002, ought to be a very content man. Of the new seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), three owe political allegiance to Jiang, who almost literally returned from his grave to wield authority as Party elder in the selection of PSC members behind the scenes. (A year ago Jiang was reported to be dead or dying but obviously someone was jumping the gun.)

Outgoing leader Hu Jintao has only two allies in the new all-powerful group, the most important one being Li Keqiang, who will be the new Premier, and Liu Yunshan, who will presumably be in charge of propaganda. The new top leader, Xi Jinping (pictured), is neither directly a Jiang or Hu protégé but acceptable to both.

The remaining PSC member, Wang Qishan, who has been given the task of tackling corruption, is closer to Jiang than Hu, but reputed to be very much his own man. He could prove to be a key figure in the new leadership. Though Li Keqiang will formally be in charge of the economy, Wang can be expected to weigh in on major economic decisions. Wang is a historian by training but has been a influential economic leader in recent years.

The second observation is that China has been taken over by princelings. 'Princelings' is a colloquial Chinese political term for the sons and daughters of revolutionary Communist leaders. They are strongly resented by many Chinese because they are looked upon as having advanced their careers and amassed fortunes because of their privileged backgrounds. The fall of princeling Bo Xilai exposed the extent of corruption which surrounds the offspring of those who founded the People's Republic of China.

In addition to Xi Jinping, two of the PSC members are princelings, and Wang Qishan is reportedly the son of a high-level official and married to a princeling. Regardless of whether princelings are competent leaders, they do not evoke respect or confidence, especially among the younger generation of Chinese, who yearn to see their country reform into a more just and equitable society.

Both the opaque way in which the leaders of China were (yet again) selected behind closed doors and the outcome reflect how estranged the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has become from the country's populace.

Photo by Flickr user Secretary of Defense.

While we wait for the announcement later today of who will govern China over the next five to ten years, it is worth digesting a few facts about China's new group of 205 most influential citizens.

These are the 195 men and 10 women selected on Wednesday as members of the new Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party before the closing of the 18th National Congress. Additionally, there is a group of 171 alternate members of the Central Committee, the so-called B-Group of the country's most prestigious citizens.

The number of women among Central Committee members dropped from 13 to 10, remarkable considering the tiny proportion of females chosen in 2007. China has sent its first female astronaut into space, but Communist Party politics remains basically a mens club. The present 24-member Politburo has one female member, Liu Yandong. Though she has been mentioned as a candidate for the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, it is highly unlikely she will be among that group when it today marches on to the stage in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

Another discriminated group within the Chinese political domain is the business community. Not a single entrepreneur made it on to the Central Committee, even as an alternate member.

Unsurprisingly, the new Central Committee includes all the men and women who have been tipped to be among candidates to be elevated today to the Politburo and all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Equally unsurprising is that real competition even for this larger group of leaders was extremely limited, with only 19 candidates eliminated from a list of 224 names on the basis of the secret ballot. More...

Daniel Bell, a Canadian who teaches political science at Tsinghua, one of China's most prestigious universities, has of late been rattling foreign China watchers with his commentary about alternatives to democracy in China.

Bell claims that because democracy is flawed as an ideal, China's political future is more likely to be determined by the Confucian tradition of 'humane authority'. He also criticises Westerners who judge political progress simply by asking whether China is becoming more democratic.

I share some of Bell's concerns about the dangers of thinking about China's political future as a linear path with the ultimate goal of multi-party parliamentarianism. I also agree with Bell about the need for cultural sensitivity when assessing developments in China (or any other country).

Now, however, Bell has taken his ideas a step too far.

In an opinion piece called 'In Defence of How China Picks its Leaders', written with Eric Li, a Shanghai-based American venture capitalist, Bell states that the Chinese political system 'comes close to the best formula for governing a large country: meritocracy at the top, democracy at the bottom, with room for experimentation in-between.' He also writes that the 'Chinese regime has developed the right formula for choosing political rulers that is consistent with China's culture and history and suitable to modern circumstances.'

If I did not know that Bell does indeed live in Beijing I would think he is locked up in an ivory tower on an isolated island.

Yesterday I saw myself misquoted by Xinhua, China's official news agency: 

On the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, China, as the host of the Six-Party Talks, has functioned as more than just a coordinator. Linda Jacobson, East Asia program director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia, said China had played a responsible part both in facilitating talks and in solving emergencies, which was conducive to regional security.

I have not spoken with anyone from Xinhua for exactly one year. A year ago I attended an international seminar organised in Beijing by the Chinese Foreign Ministry's international relations institute about the Korean Peninsula. I agreed to be interviewed by a Xinhua reporter. I asked to see the quotes, and was shown them but later informed that my quotes would not be needed. In the quote which I checked and approved I said: 

Back in the period 2007-2009 China was looked upon as a constructive player in the 6-party talks BUT since the Choenan Incident in 2010 and Beijing's choice of reaction thereafter, China's credibility as a broker on the Korean Peninsula has come into question.

This is annoying. Xinhua's confected quote will be reproduced in literally dozens of newspapers and other news services worldwide. Xinhua News Agency is, after all, China's sole official news service, and used widely around the globe.

I'm not the only Lowy Institute scholar to be misquoted by China's media, and this incident serves as yet another example of how frustratingly difficult it is to convey one's thoughts to Chinese readers. Millions of Chinese citizens are keen to learn about foreigners' views, but the official media continues to either censor or intentionally misconstrue any stance which does not conform to what the propaganda officials have deemed as the correct interpretation.

The Chinese Government continues to keep its citizens and the rest of the world in the dark about the health and whereabouts of China's leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, who has not been seen in public since 1 September. Yet, wild rumours about Xi's possible fate seem to be overblown.

If Xi was gravely ill or had encountered political problems, which would call into question his anointment as head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the upcoming Party Congress, senior leaders would not be traveling and the leadership would be convening in Beijing. That is standard CCP practice at a time of crisis. Yet Hu Jintao did not cut short his trip to Vladivostok for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; another senior leader, Wu Bangguo, traveled to Iran; and a third high-ranking official has visited Sichuan this week.

Emails from Chinese friends report that there is no sign of heightened security in Beijing, another sign that Chinese leaders are not bracing for a political crisis.

I recall that in 1993 then-Premier Li Peng was not seen in public for seven weeks, leading to similar gossip and rumours of an impending political crisis. In those days, this all took place via word-of-mouth. There was no internet and no Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter except that the Chinese Government tries to censor Weibo). Today, more than 300 million Chinese have social media accounts. Xi's mysterious disappearance is a hot topic.

The ongoing Xi debacle is one further sign that the contradictions of China's political system are reaching a crescendo. Senior CCP officials, especially those in charge of propaganda and communication, are completely out of touch with reality and the aspirations of Chinese citizens. China is today a vibrant, multi-faceted society in which people discuss, probe, and have opinions. But the Communist Party leadership clings to its rigid and secretive ways, and plays deaf. In the words of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, 'We have told everybody everything.'

Photo by Flickr user Antonio Villaigrosa.

The Australia-US alliance is at the forefront in any discussion by Australian policy-makers and specialists about regional security issues. The announcement during President Barack Obama's visit to Australia in November 2011 of an agreement to rotate US Marines in and out of Darwin was viewed by both the Australian Government and Opposition as not only strengthening the decades-old alliance, but also a reflection of the importance of Australia-US ties.

The view from Washington, DC appears to be a bit different. Australia got somehow left out when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last week listed US treaty allies in Asia. Clinton was elaborating on how the US is strengthening its ties in the region during a speech on 7 March in  honour of the 40th anniversary of Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972. She mentioned Japan, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines but made no mention of Australia. Clinton's exact words were:

All of this effort has taken place within a larger regional push to strengthen our ties throughout the Asia Pacific. We’ve enhanced our relationships with our treaty allies Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. We’ve broadened our relationships with other emerging powers, including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. We've strengthened our unofficial relationship with Taiwan. We’ve reengaged with Burma. We’ve invested in regional multilateral institutions, including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN. We’ve increased our economic engagement, updated our regional military posture and amplified our advocacy for the rule of law and universal human rights. In short, we are working around the clock to do everything we can to defend and advance security and prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific. And having that positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China is vital to every one of those objectives.

Saturday marks the first of many crucial elections in 2012. Taiwan's presidential race is viewed as extremely tight between President Ma Ying-jeou (pictured; Kuomintang Party) and Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party. Presumably, the majority of swing voters will opt for the incumbent president Ma, choosing predictability rather than the unknown.

If Ma wins, as I anticipate that he will, many in Beijing, other capitals across the Asia Pacific and Washington will sigh with relief, presuming Ma's victory would mean that tension in the Taiwan Strait will be avoided for another four years.

However, that might not prove accurate. Beijing will not allow reunification to remain an elusive goal indefinitely. It is possible that Beijing's new leaders, set to take office at the end of this year, will increase pressure on Ma to enter into talks about Taiwan's unresolved political future.

But Ma has little room to maneuver in his cross-Strait policies. Despite the warming of ties between the mainland and Taiwan during Ma's first term, the vast majority of Taiwanese continue to support the status quo; in other words, Taiwan's de facto independence with its own political system, its own currency and its own military but lacking de jure independence and international recognition.

In a May 2011 study, Robert Sutter writes that many people in Taiwan and abroad favour the status quo because they erroneously perceive it as allowing the Taiwan administration to enjoy independence of action. Sutter views a rising China as accumulating economic, political and military leverage over Taiwan, which is increasingly forcing Taiwan to follow a path of accommodation (and eventual reunification) with China.

Of all the Asian societies facing the predicament of relying on China for economic prosperity while at the same time fearing a possible security threat from China, Taiwan is the most vulnerable.

Linda Jakobson elaborates on the legacy of Ma's first term in a South China Morning Post op-ed.

Photo by Flickr user jamesonwu.

With Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin arriving in China for a working visit on 11 October, the big question will be whether gas price negotiations between Russia and China will finally end in a concrete agreement that allows work on even one of the two much talked-about gas pipelines from Russia to China to actually start.

China's growing international standing is straining its relations with Russia. Moreover, two of the main drivers of the relationship a decade ago — arms sales and energy cooperation — are flagging. That's the main conclusion from a new SIPRI report about China's security and energy relations with Russia, which I wrote with former colleagues at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute before moving to Sydney and the Lowy Institute.

In 2010, oil imports from Russia constituted just 6% of China's total oil imports and Russia was only China's fifth-largest supplier of oil. China's concerted efforts to diversify reliance on any one supplier of either oil or gas have weakened Russia's bargaining position, despite the fact that Russia is the world's largest producer of oil and the second largest of natural gas.

China and Russia have discussed natural gas pipelines since the mid-1990s. Several feasibility studies have been conducted. In 2006, China National Petroleum Corporation and Gazprom, Russia's largest natural gas producer, agreed to construct a western line from Taishet in Russia's Altai Republic to China's Central Asia pipeline in Xinjiang province (the Altai project), along with an eastern line from Sakhalin Island to the north-east of China.

But to date, these plans exist on paper only. The problem has been agreeing on a price for the gas that China will commit to purchase from Russia. The Russians demand European-level prices while the Chinese want the price to be based on (much lower) Chinese domestic prices.