1. What specifically should we do to improve our relationship with Indonesia?

Last year, my colleague Fergus Hanson recommended a 'major leadership gesture' in order to kick the relationship into a higher gear, and proposed a big increase in aid funding going towards Indonesian education (a 'Colombo plan' for Indonesia). More recently, Hugh White and Josh Frydenberg have recommended funding boosts for Australians studying in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region.

There's something to be said for this approach, especially given the direct (though long-term) national interest pay-off for Australia, as demonstrated by the Lowy Institute's research on Pacific leadership.

But aid funding of Indonesian students would be the action of a donor toward a client, and although that still defines part of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, it's not the world we're heading into, with Indonesia growing so fast. So is there some major initiative the two countries could launch together that would create a step-change in the relationship?

2. What's wrong with the status quo? What harm would be caused if we did nothing?

Those who want a more substantive relationship have to overcome the inherent problem that human beings (and perhaps especially politicians) are biased towards loss aversion. It may be true that there are untold gains to be made from closer ties with Jakarta, but that doesn't motivate action in the same way as averting losses. And really, what are we losing by just keeping things roughly as they are with Indonesia?

The various reports also noted that GPF was 'not core business' for the Australian departments involved. The personnel involved had more important items on their work programs, and it was not clearly career-enhancing.

Meanwhile, AusAID's usual heavy-handed governance kept tight control over the funds, so longer-term planning (actually creating positions in the organisational structure and recruiting people to do this work) was not possible. Nor was it possible to show that GPF had enhanced gender equality. It may not have done much directly to alleviate poverty either.

This project got underway because Prime Minister Howard told department heads that he wanted it done: 'make it so!' It seems to have lost momentum, and it needs a high-level (not high profile) kick-along.

How do we judge whether it is 'effective'? We can't, really. We can be pretty sure that some of it is a waste of time and money. It might be like advertising, where half is wasted, but we don't know which half. A program like this needs persistence and constant adaptation. But if you want to weave the spiderweb of ties, this is the sort of thing you need to do. It needs to be made 'core business' and sustained over a long period. Is it worthwhile? Ask the Treasury youngsters, whose lives were changed by a year in Jakarta.

Photo by Flickr user Eric @ Flickr.

In brief, the people-to-people contact regularly raised in the debate needs to be given substance. I understand some of the obstacles are being erected by Indonesian bureaucrats and these need to be challenged. Other barriers include Indonesians being unable to use the E-visa system.

Whatever we do relationships will never improve unless we go beyond trade, security and defence. They're not the foundations for long-lasting friendship and respect.

Doing so would increase the 'spiderweb of ties' Steve Grenville describes, facilitate public diplomacy targeted to locally important issues, open business opportunities in second-tier cities like Medan (pictured), Balikpapan and Makassar, help Australian entities operate in provinces important for issues like climate change mitigation, and contribute to a more responsive travel advisory. Broadening regional ties will require government leadership, for instance by placing diplomats outside Jakarta or having them travel to the regions far more often. Expanding ACICIS to universities outside Java would be another good step.

The third area is pop culture. East Timor, the Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks are a part of our country's shared histories, and it's natural that they are reflected in pop culture (some examples of how Indonesia is represented in Australian pop culture).

But the great many people who move between our countries for work, holiday and study are also part of that shared history. When a young couple on 'Home and Away' face heartbreak as one of them takes up a job in Indonesia, or the Summer Bay locals are wowed by an Indonesian student/surfer, it will both reflect deepening engagement, while also perhaps encouraging more Australians to see engagement with Indonesia as 'normal'.

* The author undertook the ACICIS program in 1998.

Photo by Flickr user Batubara Ismail Rahmat.

If learning 'others' is universally good and essential to self-understanding, these 'others' need not be Indonesians. For most Australians, however, what could be better than Indonesia (not just Bali, or Jakarta)? It is one most confronting and richly diverse 'others' in the region. It is located on Australia's doorstep, rendering it the most affordable path to self-discovery.

In Australia and Indonesia alike, people know more and still desire to know more about the world's two empires on the other side of the globe than about their immediate neighbours. Despite all the complaints about the status of Indonesian studies in Australia, actually the situation here is better than in Indonesia.The question 'Why should more Australians learn Indonesia?' annoys me at times, because I assume everyone should know better. But the reverse question, 'Should Indonesians learn more about Australia?' is unthinkable in Indonesia. This is despite the fact that more Indonesians stay for lengthy periods in Australia than the reverse.

Indonesia has been narrowly defined in discussions about Australia-Indonesia relations. Most frequently, knowing Indonesia means knowing only two small circles of people who are equally isolated from the vast majority. One is the nation's elite (in government and business), the other is the underground terrorist leaders.

Why these two? The former is expected to be instrumental to Australians' efforts to maximise their interests. The other hardens the long-standing presumptions about 'others', reaffirming that the self has been morally superior all along. Both help Australians resist the challenge of learning more seriously about the world, and ultimately knowing themselves better.

Photo by Flickr user PixelPlacebo.

My thinking remains mostly the same. Economic enmeshment – following Stephen's 'spiderweb of ties' concept – is the most critical. But to achieve this, Australia and Indonesia need to set ambitious goals (like making Indonesia one of our top trading partners in 10-20 years) and map a course to get there. Getting an agreement to get us there and overcoming the many barriers to the free flow of goods and services will require serious political commitment and engagement.

On the new Colombo Plan idea, I was almost persuaded by Hugh White's recent argument that treating our region as a 'charity case' shows how little we understand the Asian Century. The fact we give aid to Indonesia does create the wrong dynamic in the relationship in plenty of circumstances, but given poverty rates in Indonesia and Indonesia's critical importance to us, I think on balance it is still better to give in a big way, particularly towards higher education. And to perhaps address Hugh's concerns, it is not as though rich countries limit their higher education scholarships to developing countries. 

On the public diplomacy front, there needs to be an inversion of the current approach. Politicians need to stop trashing the relationship for purely domestic political advantage and instead promote a more realistic and accurate image of Indonesia, similar to the way we treat that other giant, the US.

Other ideas: perhaps we could look at a joint peacekeeping force that would deploy together on UN missions. Our soldiers could also look to build a joint regional emergency response team. This might help move perceptions of Indonesia as a security threat.

Onto Sam's second question, 'What harm is done by doing nothing?'

I'd say a lot. Indonesia's future matters a lot to us. Just think of the many different trajectories it could take: disintegration into several smaller states (East Timor has about a million people and look how hard it has been managing its transition; Indonesia has over 200 million) or return to autocracy or military rule. Then there's the possibility of the election of a president who whips up anti-Australian sentiment and perhaps does nothing about the small group of extremists. Or how about economic malaise and resulting increases in extremist sentiment? Or what about continued 6%+ economic growth and tens of millions joining the middle class that we can trade with? It's a no-brainer.

Of course, Australia only has limited influence, but why not use what influence we have to push for the outcome most clearly in our interest?

Photo by Flickr user Agianda.

Of course, there are other reasons the Indonesia relationship is anaemic. One is the Indonesians themselves, who are not always keen to embrace us. Another is a version of the standard lament from foreign policy wonks, which is that there is no constituency for change: there are no votes in Indonesia policy and the number of Australians who stand to benefit from closer relations is small and diffuse (at least in the short term). And previously I suggested a fourth reason: that our politicians are wary of the implied reproach carried in every call for Australians to get to know Asia better.

So can we frame the Indonesia-relations debate in 'loss aversion' terms? I think Hugh White has gone some way toward this by arguing that Australia risks drifting away from middle-powerdom to New Zealand-like small power status unless we wake up to the Asian Century. If that drift is accompanied by relative American decline in the region, then we face a future in which Australia is far less able to shape its own destiny and much more at the mercy of others.

But that's awfully abstract, and as post-World War II Britain shows, a sharp descent in world-power status does not have to be accompanied by lower living standards. In fact, both Britain and France show that the ride down can be very comfortable indeed. So although being a 'middle power' sounds nice, what's really in it for Australians?

Some might reply that this misses the point. It is precisely because foreign policy is such a marginal issue that there's no point bothering to try to convince the electorate. The key thing is to turn the political elites around. I suspect that's been true of a lot of foreign policy issues in the past, but if the claims made about the epochal change our region is undergoing are even half right, will that be enough this time around?

Perhaps I'm embarrassingly late to this revelation, but I'm now flirting with the conclusion that committing Australia fully to the Asian Century needs to be seen not simply as a policy task but as a great national project akin to multiculturalism, Aboriginal reconciliation or the deregulation of the national economy. It is a generational task, never fully completed, that goes to the core of our national identity.

And Indonesia is really the test case. If the political class and Australians generally can't be motivated to make some real commitment to our nearest and most important South East Asian neighbour, then what hope is there for our Asian push more generally?

(BTW, I haven't mentioned the responses from Dave McRae and Ariel Heryanto, but I am completely sympathetic to the idea that individuals and particularly students can be too utilitarian about this stuff; learning more about Indonesia is a very worthy end in itself. In fact, there is much to be said for the argument [made by my favourite political philosopher, Michael Oakeshott] that, properly speaking, university education should not be vocational at all. Rather, the purpose of such an education should be to immerse the student in a 'language' specific to a particular academic discipline, allowing them to make a contribution to the conversations taking place within and between such disciplines. It is these conversations that form the core of our civilisation.

That's a romantic and probably unrealistic view of the academy; Australian universities are now overwhelmingly vocational institutions which train students for careers. But even if universities could be brought around to this ideal, it does not follow that governments should have the same concerns as universities or as individuals wanting to achieve personal growth. By necessity, Australian foreign policy is utilitarian and focused on certain specific purposes. It always will be. For government, just being closer to Indonesia can never be an end in itself.)

Each time our position was preserved. But now this is coming rapidly to an end thanks to the inexorable shift in economic weight as the great convergence erases the West's productivity advantage. This challenge is more formidable than those we have seen off before. 

This is one of the greatest shifts in our history and how we respond is indeed one of the great national tasks we have faced. One can see it as a phase, like multiculturalism, of the adaptation of a society transplanted from the northwest corner of Europe to the southeast corner of Asia. This phase has been delayed because Anglo-Saxon primacy in Asia has been prolonged for so long. But now we have to work out how to live in an Asia in which Anglo Saxons no longer wield preponderant power. It is going to be very different.

Why relations with Indonesia matter

The difference is not just about the US and China. Last week, I argued that Australia has to rethink its relationship with Indonesia precisely because Indonesia is going to be much richer and stronger than Australia within a few decades. We have always been richer and stronger than any of our neighbours. We do not see how profoundly the relationship has been shaped by the relative power balance between us, because it has worked our way and the stronger party is usually less aware of how power affects a relationship. 

Our foreign policy now has to focus very seriously on how we best preserve our interests in the relationship as power shifts from us to them. This is no abstract exercise in diplomacy; a good relationship with Indonesia when it is three or four times richer than us will be critical to our security and prosperity. A powerful Indonesia will not necessarily be threatening, but we will need to work hard to do whatever we can to make sure it isn't. This idea makes people edgy, but that is what weaker states have to do in managing relations with stronger neighbours. Lots of countries do it all the time. We've just never had to do it before.

What do we need to do?

Well, to put it most broadly, we need to start building the kind of relationship we want to have with Indonesia when Indonesia is a great power and we are, at best, a middle power. There are three obvious priorities. First, wind back the role of aid: we cannot buy a good relationship with Indonesia. Second, move on from our obsession on third order issues such as people-smuggling, live cattle and Schapelle Corby. Third, start building a sense of shared interests in the big questions about Asia's future and start resolving issues which might cause us problems in future. Above all, recognise that we are not going to be able to dictate the terms of this relationship. We need to take Indonesia's views of us seriously: Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono spelled them out in a speech to the Australian parliament in 2010. There will need to be give and take, and as the weaker power we will do more of one than the other. We should not expect to like that, but we should get used to it.

Who is responsible?

In the end, as I argued back in 2010, it is our political leaders' job to understand how our place in the world is changing, to work out how to respond and to explain to the rest of us why this is necessary. We are seeing a major failure of political leadership on this at present. The Asian Century White Paper is a major opportunity for the government to change that and much depends on that opportunity being taken.

If there must be a little critical sting in any blog entry, laudatory as it might otherwise be, it would come here: the big Australian universities should start to look at undergraduate students from Asia (and elsewhere) less as money spinners and more as future brand carriers for Australia.

Take culture, including sport: Australia is very much in Asia's driver seat in music, together with Korea, and is uncontested in all other categories, including sport. Musicals touring Asia are cast with Australian actors, major art exhibitions on Asian tours swing through Sydney, Tokyo, Shanghai and perhaps Singapore.

In sport, a little bit more emphasis on the beautiful game would not hurt; I mean soccer of course, which is played by the entire non-Anglo-Saxon world. This would mean a little less focus on archaic sports such as Gaelic football (renamed Australian rules) and cricket. OK, I know South Asia is crazy about cricket, but they will eventually grow up, too). If the Australian soccer scene could finally get its act together, many soccer stars from Asia, who are forced to seek employment in Europe, would likely rather play in the neighbourhood.

So, relax Sam: becoming Asian is not primarily a national task to throw a lot of extra money and effort at. It's is a process which is foisted on Australia by history (the Asia Pacific as the key global region of the 21st century), by geography, by immigration and much more. It should to be accompanied of course, but it will roll on regardless.

Photo by Flickr user david-tattnig.

 

Hugh White suggests 'three obvious priorities'. Winding back aid is an excellent suggestion and this can probably be done with relative ease and only minor political damage.

But the others are far more resistant. Cows, Corby and people trafficking are emotional matters, so much easier to trigger and respond to than politics and culture. Even when steers are stunned and beauticians banished other issues will fill the space. 

We have to find a way to handle 'third order' crises just as we do when they occur in the UK or US. That requires a deeper understanding of Indonesian geography, history, politics and culture being offered through schools with the same energy applied to teaching about Europe. That must include beliefs.

Now here's the real challenge for largely secular Australia trying to understand the huge role faith plays in the lives of Indonesians – and the reverse. We have to engage with moderate Islam, still the mainstream religion despite the gangster mobs masquerading as pious Muslims. 

Past contacts have included government-sponsored high-level multi-faith conferences. These have usually been tolerant and worthy – but seldom touch the easily manipulated xenophobic folk in kampongs there and suburbs here.

This can't be a one-way mission. Indonesian Islam has a heavy PR job ahead to convince us that it really is 'moderate' (the other journalist cliché); so far only the liberals (backed by US funds) have shown the enthusiasm. So here's a task for Australian Muslims to develop an enduring relationship with their colleagues in Indonesia and extend that to the wider community.

The thousand-year relationship between Britain and France has been soaked in blood, twisted by distrust and warped by all the same differences that distort Australian-Indonesian understandings. 

For the Channel substitute the Arafura Sea. For us it should be easier to establish a Southeast Asian Entente Cordiale. We've never been to war with Indonesia, we both drive on the same side of the road, and the Republic is only 67 years old. Should be a pushover.