Any comedy sketch that features the words 'Russian agriculture is in dire need of mechanisation' as a laugh line is good enough for this blog.

Enjoy the weekend.

Back in early 2009, Sam asked what the contemporary lessons were of Japan's fiscal stimulus efforts during the 1990s. I suggested that one lesson from both Japan and the 1930s US experience was that fiscal stimulus works when it's tried, but that inconsistent, or insufficient, stimulus was unlikely to deliver the desired results. Sam's response at the time suggested he didn't necessarily buy this.

I was reminded of this by the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the US fiscal stimulus. Earlier this week, Martin Wolf had a very good column in the FT, arguing that the Obama Administration had been far too cautious with its stimulus package. One result: 'This has allowed opponents to claim that policy has been ineffective when it has merely been inadequate.'

Note that this is not a case of being wise after the fact. Wolf also pointed to an earlier column where he had warned of the inadequacy of the measures being planned: 'Unfortunately, what is coming out of the US is desperately discouraging. Instead of an overwhelming fiscal stimulus, what is emerging is too small, too wasteful and too ill-focused.' Paul Krugman, who also argued at the time that the Obama package was going to be too small, has been making the same kind of point.

But, and for pretty much the same reason that Sam doubted my response to his question, I suspect that, for many, these arguments will fall on deaf ears. Maybe the success of emerging Asia's stimulus efforts will make for a more compelling example of how stimulus can work?

Finally, that Martin Wolf column begins with a thought-experiment about what might have gone wrong with FDR's policy response in the 1930s, had political circumstances been different. For one very grim take on a possible alternate America, keying off from a prolonged Great Depression, see this short story by Jo Walton.

Photo by Flickr user cbcastro, used under a Creative Commons license.

In his recent 'Strategic Snapshot', Mike Green, one of America's leading Asia hands, looks to the principles and ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan (pictured) for answers to some of the most pressing strategic challenges facing Washington today.

It's a great piece and a fascinating exercise, not least because of the enduring relevance, even increasing salience, of so many Mahanian preoccupations — the historical centrality of sea power to geopolitical influence, the interplay between geography and strategy, between offence and defence, and the importance to national well-being of seaborne trade.

For Washington, though, and for Canberra, this is not just theoretical. In both capitals, and many others as well, the growth of Chinese sea power – in particular, the extent to which China has already managed to complicate American planning – is becoming a source of considerable concern.

These anxieties are compounded by an awareness of just how difficult it will be for Washington to retain command of the sea in the way that it has for so long. Not only does it face China's emerging capabilities, but also an economy teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, a potentially more introspective population, a lost and futile war in Afghanistan, and emerging regional challengers in Moscow and Tehran.

For Mike Green one of the logical solutions involves a more equal burden-sharing arrangement among American allies. The US navy retains many potent capabilities, he notes, 'but not enough to maintain a stable strategic equilibrium without the combination of greater external balancing...'

This raises some very deep questions for Australia, whose alliance with the US has for decades been an extraordinary asset. As a new regional security order takes shape, as US primacy fades and Washington begins looking to allies for greater support in the face of rising Chinese power, could the alliance begin to entail new and more serious risks and liabilities?

Forthcoming 'Strategic Snapshots' will be exploring these questions, and many others, in the coming weeks. Stay tuned... 

Does art imitate life or does life imitate journalism? Two weeks ago, The Economist trumpeted a looming China-India rivalry as its cover story. One week ago, a series of fresh tensions arose in the China-India relationship. Today I have tried to make sense of some of this in an opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal.

The gist of my argument is that India would do well to keep a cool head, despite needling from China and the concerns – some sensible, some paranoid – of its own media and commentariat. Better still, if India is serious about advancing its own influence as a global power – and increasingly its interests will demand such a status – then it should be getting onto the diplomatic and strategic front foot in its dealings with China.

This would involve, for example, greater Indian engagement in East Asia – a trend excellently examined by C Raja Mohan and notable emerging analysts such as David Brewster and Nitin Pai. One of the challenges for India is to be the active player in building such partnerships, not – as this remarkable account of Lee Kuan Yew's 'Mission India' suggests — the passive one.

Photo by Flickr user Photoportunity, used under a Creative Commons license. 

It would be dull to join the already large chorus of commentators predicting failure for the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, launched this week in Washington. Assuming that readers of The Interpreter are smart enough to work out for themselves why the talks probably won't succeed, I have decided to join the ranks – of perhaps more accurately, the rank – of the optimists.

Writing in the New York Times, the Lowy Institute's Martin Indyk (I think he also works for Brookings) gave a number of reasons why we should 'suspend our disbelief' that the current talks will succeed. In fact, if the talks are to succeed, they will have to produce a general suspension of disbelief by creating four key illusions.

First, the illusion that Jerusalem will remain the undivided capital of Israel, while enabling the Palestinians to build their own capital in East Jerusalem and to have sovereignty over the Muslim holy sites in the Old City. You do the first by re-drawing the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, which have changed considerably since Israel took control of the eastern half of the city in 1967. 

A solution to the question of sovereignty over Muslim holy sites is more difficult, though it is also essential (no Palestinian leader can be seen to barter away Muslim rights in the Old City). It is doable, but they might need David Copperfield for that one. 

Second, the illusion that the roughly 4.8 million Palestinian refugees will be granted the 'right of return', while ensuring that few actually return to Israel. 

A recurring theme on The Interpreter is the problems associated with making predictions. The recent financial crisis is just the latest piece of evidence of a failure to forecast, and one of the big lessons we are now being encouraged to take away from it is that we no longer live in a normal world: instead of those nice bell-shaped curves with their thin tails, we are faced with much flatter probability distributions and fat tails. Or, to be a bit more poetic about it, we live in a world of black swans.

All of which makes it all the more striking that we continue to hold a very clear view of what the future for the world economy will hold.

This 'consensus future' is the world of what I have described as the Great Convergence: it is the product of rapid catch-up growth in some of the world's most populous emerging markets, which is taking us to a future where many of the biggest economies are middle income economies, and where these economies are increasingly the home of a new and expanded global middle class.  And it's a future where all of the transition problems that this process entails are (more or less successfully) overcome.

This is a view of the future that is shared by international financial institutions, by investment banks, by consultancy firms, and by think tanks. It's also the view that underpins much Treasury and RBA thinking about Australia's future. Fair enough; this is pretty much my base case for the world economy, too.

And yet. Shouldn't all of our past lessons about predictive failure serve as a warning here? 

So, if you took a range of scenarios for the future of the world economy and assigned a probability to each, then I think that the one with the highest probability score would indeed be some version of what I have described as 'our consensus future'. But note that's not the same thing as saying that the probability assigned to that scenario is especially high. In fact, my hunch is that, right now, many of us are placing too high a probability, either implicitly or explicitly, on this particular forecast of the future. An example of the overconfidence effect at work?

For more on our consensus future, see my recent Lowy Institute Perspectives paper on the subject, available here.

Photo by Flickr user mrbendy, used under a Creative Commons license.

For Australia, China has shifted from key bilateral relationship to the regional paramount power, and shapes as a system-level game changer. Kevin Rudd's term offered some markers for the movement in Canberra's China perspective.

The Rudd experience of China was notable because his predecessor, John Howard, managed for so long (in public) to hold to the narrower, bilateral conception of what China might mean. Howard maintained a laser-sharp focus on the trade bonanza to harvest the bilateral dividend. Utterly pragmatic, Howard sought to put other issues of region, alliance and international system in a separate, sealed box. This was a noteworthy achievement.  

The coming of Rudd marked the moment when the box had become a Pandora's brew too important to ignore. Rudd had neither the character nor the personal history to emulate Howard's approach. History, anyway, was shifting rapidly beyond that comfortable bilateral zone where it could be about trade alone.

Nicholas Stuart, in Rudd's Way (my review here), writes about how Beijing initially misread the China orientation of the Mandarin-speaking leader. Rudd had completed a university thesis on the protest movement in China, had personally compared Taiwan to China and during his time as a diplomat in Beijing had sought out Chinese dissidents:

It's interesting to read President Obama's remarks about the end of combat operations in Iraq in light of Peter Beinart's speech to the Lowy Institute last week. Beinart argued that the central mission of Obama's presidency is economic — to make America 'solvent' again. To do that, he has to get his country out of two expensive wars while trying to avoid looking wimpish to his Republican opponents.

There's enough in Obama's remarks to reinforce Beinart's thesis:

...our nation’s strength and influence abroad must be firmly anchored in our prosperity at home. And the bedrock of that prosperity must be a growing middle class. Unfortunately, over the last decade, we’ve not done what’s necessary to shore up the foundations of our own prosperity. We spent a trillion dollars at war, often financed by borrowing from overseas. This, in turn, has short-changed investments in our own people, and contributed to record deficits.

You can also detect it in the language Obama uses about Afghanistan:

We will disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, while preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a base for terrorists. And because of our drawdown in Iraq, we are now able to apply the resources necessary to go on offense. In fact, over the last 19 months, nearly a dozen al Qaeda leaders -- and hundreds of al Qaeda’s extremist allies -- have been killed or captured around the world.

Within Afghanistan, I’ve ordered the deployment of additional troops who -- under the command of General David Petraeus -- are fighting to break the Taliban’s momentum. As with the surge in Iraq, these forces will be in place for a limited time to provide space for the Afghans to build their capacity and secure their own future. But, as was the case in Iraq, we can’t do for Afghans what they must ultimately do for themselves.

Notice that the word 'defeat' is only applied to al Qaeda. When it comes to the Taliban, the American mission is just to 'break its momentum'. That's immediately followed by a clear signal that the US wants to hand over to the locals. 

But as Beinart said, Obama hasn't yet laid the rhetorical groundwork for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. To do that, he needs to recast the terrorist threat, so that Americans are convinced it is safe to pull out. There's no hint of that in this speech.

Image courtesy of the White House.

The Interpreter's ongoing debate over the Greens' foreign policy positions led me to look for examples of tripartisanship when it comes to Australia's engagement with Asia.

Here's one close to the heart of many Asia-watchers and engagers in Australia: all three parties — the Coalition, ALP and Greens — support greater commitment to 'Asian literacy' in Australia. Then-PM Rudd and Opposition Leader Abbott made this clear in their respective speeches to Asialink's National Forum on 'mapping our future in the Asian Century', as does this Greens policy initiative.

Of course, commitment and follow-through are not the same thing, as Michael Wesley noted in an earlier blog post.

Photo by Flickr user dawnzy58, used under a Creative Commons license. 

Steve Hind writes:

I think Sam Roggeveen's criticism of Reynolds' defence of the Greens is disingenuous in two ways.

1. Reynolds did address the substance of Greens policy, which you claimed she did not. Amongst other things, she showed that policies that were criticised for their 'eccentricity' were in fact broadly supported by the Australian people.
2. Your implication that if the Greens could be slurred in 600 words, Reynolds could defend them in 750 doesn't make an enormous amount of sense. Most of Shearer's attacks involved outlining a policy position and then asserting that it's wrong/extreme/undesirable. A rebuttal that sought to do more than level counter-assertions would necessarily have to be significantly more lengthy.

Justin Jones is Navy Fellow at the Lowy Institute and is the maritime adviser to the MacArthur Foundation Lowy Institute Asia Security Project.

The news this morning is that a Russian commercial gas carrier has successfully exploited the famed Northwest Passage, carrying its cargo from Murmansk to Ningbo, China. This is the first large commercial vessel (70,000 tonnes of gas) to make the passage since the 2007 summer season, when the Northwest Passage was declared ice-free for the first time since records began in 1978.

The impact is significant. The route used is half the distance of that through the Suez Canal and will therefore be considerably cheaper in cost (four times cheaper, according to the SMH) and time.

Of course, for the moment, the Northwest Passage will be a seasonal route, unlike the Suez Canal. Here are some facts worth considering, though. China has observer status on the Arctic Council and has voiced a right of access to potential mineral wealth in the region. China has a research station established in Norway and deploys a Russian-built icebreaker to the area. Might there be potential here for a Sino-Russian joint venture, as discussed here?

China's sea lines of communication and various territorial claims in the South China Sea attract considerable scrutiny and debate. Spare a thought for more northern regions, where Mark II of this phenomenon may emerge.

Photo by Flickr user Walter Parenteau, used under a Creative Commons license.

A quick editorial note on the subtext that I detect in the post we published yesterday by Anna Reynolds, international adviser to Greens leader Bob Brown. 

Anna was defending Greens foreign policy against criticisms made by Shearer, Cook and to some degree myself (you can read every post in the debate here). But Anna declares early in her piece that the '750 or so words that have been allocated to me' are insufficient to rebut the arguments made in those posts, and she focuses instead on the Greens' parliamentary activism on foreign affairs.

It's not clear to me why 750 words is insufficient to even make a start at a rebuttal (Shearer's initial post was just over 600 words). And remember, this was Anna's second opportunity to address the criticisms — I also published her email last week, and on that occasion too, she chose to focus on the Greens parliamentary performance, an issue that was not raised in any of the critiques we published.

Personally, I congratulate the Greens on their parliamentary activism, and on securing Julia Gillard's agreement for a parliamentary debate on Afghanistan. But what Cook and Shearer criticised was the substance of Greens foreign policy. Those criticisms have still not been addressed.

With President Obama declaring the Iraq 'combat mission' officially over (though George Packer calls it 'a meaningless milestone, constructed almost entirely out of thin air'), this seems like a good moment for a personal reflection on the toll of war.

The voice you hear in this animation is of American Battle of the Bulge veteran Joseph Robertson.

 (H/t Daily What.)

• Should there be indicators and limits for consumption in developed countries? The New York Times asks if the top billion need a set of Millennium Development Goals.
• Philanthropy in the US has hit new heights with Bill Gates and Warren Buffett claiming they have convinced forty US billionaires to donate at least 50% of their fortunes to charity. This 'Giving Pledge' effort looks to be going global and has the potential to be rolled out in China and India. It has been reported that Germany's rich have rejected the idea. 
• Oxfam argues that, with the deadline for reaching the MDGs and slashing poverty only five years away and with aid budgets under pressure from the global economic crisis, there is an urgent need for new sources of help, such as the 'Robin Hood Tax' on financial transactions. This video deserves a second airing to explain the concept.
• Not something you see every day – a conference to discuss failures in technology-related development projects.
• Last week I discussed the visualisation of aid using geo-coding. Geo-coding is already being applied to the humanitarian sector, with 47 organisations coordinating their aid projects in Haiti through this website, giving donors and recipients the ability to access information that shows who is doing what and where.

Anna Reynolds is international advisor to Greens leader Senator Bob Brown (pictured).

Readers expect the Lowy Institute to reflect its own goals to 'produce fresh policy options for Australia's international policy' and to 'promote new ideas and dialogue'.  Mr Shearer's recent attack rants on the Greens for daring to have different ideas to former Liberal staffers is not becoming of this fine mission.

In the 750 or so words that have been allocated to me, I won't be able to provide a complete rebuttal of the dig at a range of Greens policies during the last week. Nor, probably, can I persuade Mr Shearer of the need to fast-track our Millennium Development Goal commitment to increase aid to 0.7% GNI as soon as possible, as the Conservatives in the UK have done.

Nor can I expect to convince Lowy columnists that nuclear energy is not a solution to climate change; or detail that, for good reason, the platforms of all Australian political parties raise some concern or caveat about the social and environmental impact of free trade agreements.

But what I can do is to provide your readers with a better insight into the valuable role that the Australian Greens actually play in debating Australian foreign policy in our national Parliament. This is important, as it's the Greens electoral success and elevated role in the Parliament that has stirred Lowy's columnists to warn of the 'pretty scary' prospect of Greens playing a more significant role in Australian foreign policy debates. 

So it's appropriate for your readers to weigh these shrill warnings against the practice of Greens decision-makers.

Michael Wesley's two most recent posts have rearranged my mental furniture a little. It simply had never occurred to me that the US and Australia could wind up competing for influence in Indonesia, and that Australia might be on the losing side of such a competition.

I agree with Malcolm Cook that, were this scenario to come about, it would actually present a pretty benign picture for Australia. In fact, a future in which Australia has to deal with a strong Indonesia that is friendly to the US looks more attractive than the most obvious alternatives – a weak, fractious and poor Indonesia, or a unified and wealthy Indonesia that is hostile to the US.

And yes, Michael's scenario could leave Australia in a relatively weaker position, in economic and strategic terms. But if, in return, we get a politically stable, economically vibrant near neighbour that is close to the US, wouldn't we take that offer? What matters more for Australia: to be secure, or to be important?

Hugh White and others worry about a new parity of forces in such a scenario. As Michael summarises the current position, 'Indonesia has a huge army but small naval and air forces; Australia has a small army but potent naval and air capabilities.' That disparity works for both sides, but will change as Indonesia gets stronger.

• Further to Fergus' posts on the ICC's recent offensives: yet another press release today – this time, the ICC Registrar is going to Kenya.
• US weekly The National Review examines Australia's election. (Thanks to Andrew for the link.)
• Poorly made in China: CFR's Elizabeth Economy recommends 'one of the best business books on China that I have encountered in a long time.'
• They get around: while Fergus reports below on a Chinese naval visit to Vanuatu, one of the PLA Navy's most modern frigates recently visited Myanmar.
• Lessons for Afghanistan? Reader Will suggests this new book on how peacekeeping and peacebuilding failed in Congo. The author also wrote an article on the same theme for Foreign Affairs in 2008.
• Thanks to Judah for sending me this Turkish op-ed arguing that Turkey's annual military parade undermines its democracy. Military parades have been a recurring theme on The Interpreter.
• Novelist Nick Hornby tries to make sense of the universe, and reflects on the pointlessness of whatever writing project you happen to be working on (h/t Fallows):

There was a bit of interest recently when the foundation stone was laid on the Chinese funded military HQ in East Timor. 

Reader Rod has sent in some photos of another example of Chinese military diplomacy — this time, a port visit to Vanuatu last weekend.

Yesterday, I speculated on what might lie behind the latest press release from the International Criminal Court shaming Kenya and Chad for inviting Sudan's wanted President to visit. This morning I had another press release waiting for me.

It carries the bland heading: 'ICC Registrar meets with the Attorney General of the State of Qatar'. That would be quite uninteresting except that it was in Qatar in March last year that Arab leaders rejected the Court's decision to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan's President.

The press release claims:

During the meeting Mrs. Arbia and Dr. Al-Marri emphasized their shared commitment to the rule of law and the need to respect international law.

Apparently, the Court is doing its best to shore up support among Arab states and hopefully win their cooperation in arresting Al Bashir.

On a separate note, Geoff Tooth was appointed Australia’s High Commissioner to Kenya today. Hopefully there will be no more visits from wanted Presidents.

Photo by Flickr user sigma, used under a Creative Commons license.

That's The Browser's comment on this Spiegel interview with the foreign minister of Iran. 

Although you'd be hard pressed to say that the interview actually gets better than this explosive opening exchange, the whole thing is worth a read:

SPIEGEL: Mr. Foreign Minister, you are the senior diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran. You represent a nation that prides itself on a cultural history stretching back more than 2,500 years. Don't you find it shameful that people are stoned to death in your country?

Manouchehr Mottaki: You come from a country that murdered millions of people during a tyrannical war, and you want to talk to me about human rights?

(BTW, nice to see a senior Iranian official acknowledging that the Holocaust did happen, even if he is using it as a rather tasteless debating tactic. Mottaki now just needs to convince his boss.)

China seizing second spot from Japan on the world economic table was a milestone in measuring changing power relativities. It was also a moment to reflect on the tools we use to compare economies. Is it to be purchasing power parity (PPP) or the US exchange rate?

PPP is the new kid on the block. The US dollar exchange rate is the way we have measured much in the world since World War II, and especially since 1971 when Nixon closed the gold window and threw the currency switch to hyperdrive.

Japan has just dropped from second to third on the league ladder using the traditional measure of the US exchange rate. But using PPP, we passed that moment quite some time ago. This illustrates a point Mark Thirlwell made when skewering the idea that PPP is some sort of new age con:

When giving presentations, I also often tell my audience that the choice of PPP vs dollar exchange rates can sometimes be decided by the presenter's agenda: want to downplay the importance of emerging markets? Then cite US$ estimates of GDP comparisons. Want to emphasise it? Then PPP. Hence the case for reporting both.

As always, Mark is the guru on such matters and he can do the serious economic lifting. The Canberra Column's contribution will be to point to the way PPP has established itself as a respectable and quoted measure in key areas of the Australian government and bureaucracy.

The recent withdrawal of the last US combat forces from Iraq and the equally recent reminder from the Al Qaeda affiliates across the country that they remain operationally active has elicited little in the way of introspection from commentators in this country. 

Australia left what seems a long time ago, well after public interest in our contribution had faded. If our much more costly military operations in Afghanistan rate such limited discussion in this country, it is hardly surprising that 'yesterday's war' is not considered newsworthy. Nevertheless, one would have thought that at least some discussion was warranted of what our contribution to the overall Iraq venture achieved.

Amid photos of soldiers giving the thumbs up and proclaiming victory as they leave Iraq, there are some who have a sense of the enormity of the problem that remains. In an earlier post, I was critical of those who conflated US withdrawal from Iraq with victory, so I watched with interest the US commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, take the long view in a recent interview: 'To say whether we've won the war or not, we can see that in three to five years, as we see how Iraq turns out. I think we can call operations a success...'

In the good old days of 'classical war', successful military operations were the sole determinant of success. But as General Odierno has acknowledged, contemporary warfare among complex societies is about much more than military operations. And success or otherwise can only be measured after years, or even decades. 

I hope that if parliament ever gets around to debating our commitment to Afghanistan, speakers will have taken heed of General Odierno's words before they pen their own.

Photo by Flickr user tommigodwin, used under a Creative Commons license.

• Blowing in the wind: not long ago, it seemed that commercial and job-creation imperatives in France's defence industry were going to bestow Russia with the sort of maritime reach the Soviets never had. But now it looks like the sale of four Mistral strategic projection ships is in doubt. 
• Earlier this year, I recommended this paper setting out the challenges the US faced from Chinese anti-access maritime capabilities. Now for the sequel. This study is making a splash in Washington. It looks at what Air-Sea Battle might mean in practice. But one aspect is not new: the name has been around since a simpler, if not gentler, age. 
• This is proving a nasty year for India's security outlook: Chinese assertiveness, hints of Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, little joy with Pakistan, an intifada in Kashmir, Maoist insurgency worsening, and the fear of Mumbai-style terrorism at the Commonwealth Games. Capturing these anxieties, this piece is worth a look. 
• At least New Delhi seems to be keeping a clear and calm head in its dealings with China. A row over China's denial of a visa to a Kashmir-based Indian military commander had threatened to derail bilateral defence ties. Sensibly, India is not adopting the attitude China brings to its dealings with America - putting national pride ahead of military dialogue.

Andrew Selth is a Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and author of Civil-Military Relations in Burma: Portents, Predictions and Possibilities.

If all goes according to plan, on 7 November Burma's ruling council will hold nation-wide elections for what it is calling a 'genuine multi-party discipline-flourishing democracy'.

The creation of an elaborate, multi-layered parliamentary system is clearly aimed at consolidating and perpetuating military rule. However, as the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville noted more than 150 years ago, once they are begun, such transitions can have unintended consequences.

The post-2010 scenario favoured by most commentators and activists is that, after its sham elections are held, and its faux parliamentary structure is in place, the Naypyidaw regime will continue to pursue its militarisation of Burmese society, leading to an even wider gulf between the armed forces leadership and the civilian population.

According to this thesis, the controlled engagement of selected civilians in the new national and provincial assemblies is designed to reduce social pressures while confirming the current power position of the armed forces in state and society. It is also aimed at eliminating — or at least neutralising — alternative sources of power and influence, including opposition political movements and ethnic minority organisations.

Based on the regime's behaviour over the past 20 years, the obvious aims of the 2008 constitution, and the restrictive electoral regulations promulgated in recent months, such an outcome is quite possible — even likely. Yet, in a number of ways, the implementation of the new constitution will significantly alter Burma's political landscape.

Malcolm Cook recently took me to task for my excessively realist take on Indonesia. The essence of his argument was, 'Why should Australia be worried about an Indonesia that is democratic and prosperous, Washington-aligned, and has a powerful navy and air force?'

Well, why indeed. It's a really good question and made me think a bit.

Hypothetically, let's say Indonesia in 2050 is the world's sixth largest country by population (according to UN estimates, India, China, the US, Pakistan and Nigeria will have larger populations than Indonesia in 2050) and also has the world's sixth most powerful military. It is stable, prosperous and aligned with the US.

Where does that leave us? A bit like New Zealand. There would be little we could add to Indonesia's efforts to ensure order in the South China Sea and eastern Indian Ocean, so why not scale down and enjoy a peace dividend?

It would also make us a bit like Canada. With our own security guaranteed by a powerful neighbour that needs to protect the southern approaches to its own territory, we'll be left searching for a clear and differentiated role in the region and the world.

But spot the difference – Canada and New Zealand share close cultural continuities with their more powerful neighbours. If this is the future we're heading towards, shouldn't we be making a bit more of an effort to understand Indonesian society and culture, and even speak a bit of the lingo?

At almost warp speed, cyber attack has joined terrorist attack at the top of Australia's threat list. Call them the new dire duo of globalisation — the jihadist and the malign screen jockey. Where terrorism elevated the non-state actor to the top of the threat list, the cyber threat erases much of the ability to distinguish between the state and the non-state attacker.

The twin themes of cyber and terror came through strongly in a presentation by the director general of ASIO, David Irvine, in the National Security Lecture Series at the University of Canberra. Eventually, the text of the speech should appear here on the ASIO site. As Irvine expressed the twin threat, terrorism and cyber attack challenge governments and challenge legal systems. He placed the two issues at the head of his list of threats to Australia's security and Australian lives: terrorist violence first and cyber attack second.

The dire duo were discussed in depth. Everything else mentioned was lightly listed: uncontrolled movements of people, the drug trade, virulent pandemics and climate change. Challenged later on climate change straying into ASIO's remit, Irvine virtually conceded it was on the list to make up the numbers. ASIO, he said, will not be hiring climatologists, unless they also happen to speak a couple of the languages of interest.

The terrorism discussion was a succinct restatement of the Counter-Terrorism White Paper: 'I can tell you quite bluntly, Australia is a potential terrorist target. This has become a persistent feature in Australia's security environment.'

Irvine said that, on four occasions, a mass-casualty terrorist attack in Australia had been avoided. He said three of those planned attack would have been the work of home-grown terrorists. The national security nightmare is the terrorist attack which is 'globally inspired but locally generated.'

Jim Molan's list of Afghanistan questions begins with, 'Is the war winnable?' But this strategic question ought to be preceded by a grand-strategic one: Is the war worth winning?

Here are some other questions that flow from those five words:

• What are the most important issues facing Australia in the modern world, and does our Afghanistan commitment reflect these priorities? Should our military and diplomatic focus instead be on:
  • coping with the rising powers of Asia and the relative decline of the US?
  • preparing for Australia's own relative decline against fast-growing Southeast Asian economies?
  • reinforcing and encouraging Indonesia's transition to democracy and modernity?
  • building regional and international institutions that can guard Australia against strategic shocks, whether these be economic, strategic or environmental?
• At what point should Australia stop trying to build credits with the US through troop commitments, and instead serve the alliance by counseling US restraint?
• Should Australia try to convince the US — perhaps by withdrawing our forces — that the war is a strategic sideshow and that the US ought to focus its attention on rebuilding its economic strength so that it can remain a strong Pacific power?
• Will the terrorist threat diminish noticeably if we achieve our Afghanistan war aims, or will terrorists simply migrate to other lawless territories?
• If Australia's withdrawal did lead to an increased terrorist threat, could we live with that?
• In terms of counter-terrorism, what is the opportunity cost of the Afghanistan mission? Could the resources be better used to:
  • buttress our very successful regional counter-terrorism approach, which focuses on intelligence and policing?
  • do something about Australia's diplomatic deficit, given that diplomacy has been crucial to opening doors to regional counter-terrorism cooperation?
  • improve the resilience of Australian infrastructure against terrorist strikes?

The International Criminal Court issued one of its more interesting press releases on Friday. A Pre-Trial Chamber at the Court decided to inform the UN Security Council of the visit by Sudan's wanted President, Omar Al Bashir (pictured), to Kenya and Chad — both of which are states parties to the Court and have committed to cooperating in arresting all of the suspects it has indicted.

It's not the first time the President, who is wanted for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, has risked international travel, but it does suggest the Court is changing its approach: switching from quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy to public shaming (although it took some time to comment on the visit to Chad). 

A spokesperson for Human Rights Watch said 'hosting al-Bashir would throw into question Kenya's commitment to cooperate with the ICC in its Kenyan investigation.' It probably does, but Kenya has still made a firm commitment to cooperate with the Court so this more assertive approach from the Court is a welcome development. 

Photo by Flickr user Ammar Abd Rabbo, used under a Creative commons license. 

Aaron Connelly is a Fulbright scholar and visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. He visited Banda Aceh for The Interpreter; earlier posts here, here, here and here.

In early May, the elected head of the district of South Aceh ordered all the civil servants in the district to shave off their beards. 'This is Indonesia, not Iran,' Husin Yusuf, the district head, told the local paper. 'Civil servants will be good role models for the people.' Unshorn civil servants arriving at the office would be turned away, he said.

Many Indonesian Muslims wear a token amount of facial hair on their chin as a sign of their faith, though most Indonesian Islamic scholars say it is not required. Within Islamic jurisprudence outside of Indonesia, the issue is more hotly debated, and some Indonesian Muslims who look to the today's Middle East for spiritual guidance grow longer beards. The Jakarta Post noted that some of the more religious civil servants thought Husin's order unreasonable — as well might many progressive citizens in Western countries.

Husin's condescension toward more conservative forms of Islam stands in stark contrast to the image of Aceh painted by the overseas press when it runs the odd wire report on bylaws demanding the province. These condensed reports, in isolation, miss the nuance of the situation, including the uneven enforcement of shariah bylaws across the province's nineteen districts and municipalities, and the opposition to further draconian measures among most provincial officials. The governor, his deputy, and the head of the provincial legislature all publicly oppose stricter shariah bylaws.

When I visited Banda Aceh late last month, I met many young Muslim women who chose not to wear a headscarf. I asked each of them whether they were concerned that the police unit that enforces some shariah bylaws, the Wilayatul Hisbah (WH), would detain them for not doing so.

Last month we published this paper by former Australian Chief of Army Peter Leahy. In the midst of the election campaign, and the author's comments elsewhere on other defence issues, it drew only fleeting media attention.

But, as momentum gathers over the argument for a parliamentary debate on Australia's role in Afghanistan, Peter Leahy's Lowy publication is gaining fresh and deeper attention. It was the subject of a feature article in the weekend edition of the Australian Financial Review (frustratingly, not available online), has caught the attention of the Greens, and could prove an influential work in reopening the question of whether and how Australia's parliament might authorise executive decisions to deploy force abroad.

Photo by Flickr user yewenyi, used under a Creative Commons license.